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INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, Judge Antonin Scalia, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, published a dramatic and provoca-
tive essay on the law of standing. The thesis can be found in the title: 
The Doctrine of Standing As An Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers. 1 Only recently named a judge, and having taught administra-
tive and constitutional law for many years, Judge Scalia called for a 
significant shift in the law of standing. 
Judge Scalia's argument hinged on a distinction between two kinds 
of cases. "[W]hen an individual who is the very object of a law's re-
quirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has stand-
ing. "2 But standing should frequently be unavailable when "the 
plaintiff is complaining of an agency's unlawful failure to impose a 
requirement or prohibition upon someone else. "3 In the latter case, 
Judge Scalia contended that there was a serious interference with exec-
utive power. Judge Scalia concluded that in cases of the latter sort, 
courts should hold that Article III imposes "a limit upon even the 
power of Congress to convert generalized benefits into legal 
rights .... "4 The Court had not addressed this important and long-
disputed issue before. 
In 1992, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the dramatic opinion for the 
Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 5 which significantly 
1. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK u. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
2. Id. at 894. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 886. 
5. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). 
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shifts the law of standing. The opinion hinges on a distinction between 
two kinds of cases. "When ... the plaintiff is himself an object of the 
action (or forgone action) at issue ... there is ordinarily little ques-
tion" that he has standing. 6 "When, however, ... a plaintiff's asserted 
injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or 
lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed."7 In the 
latter case, there is the risk of serious interference with executive 
power, in the form of a "transfer from the President to the courts" of 
"the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' " 8 Through Justice Scalia's 
opinion, the Court held that Article III required invalidation of an 
explicit congressional grant of standing to "citizens."9 The Court had 
not answered this question before.10 
Lujan may well be one of the most important standing cases since 
World War II. Read for all it is worth, the decision invalidates the 
large number of statutes in which Congress has attempted to use the 
"citizen-suit" device as a mechanism for controlling unlawfully inade-
quate enforcement of the law.11 Indeed, the decision ranks among the 
most important in history in terms of the sheer number of federal stat-
utes that it apparently has invalidated.12 The citizen suit has become a 
staple of federal environmental law in particular: nearly every major 
environmental statute provides for citizen standing.13 The place of the 
6. 112 S. Ct. at 2137. 
7. 112 S. Ct. at 2137. 
8. 112 S. Ct. at 2145. 
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2137-40. 
10. The apparently unanimous view of lower courts had been that a legislative grant of citi-
zen standing was constitutional even without a showing of injury in fact. See, e.g., Evans v. 
Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); City of Chi-
cago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972); Citizens for a Better Envt. v. 
Deukmejian, 731 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
11. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988); Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988); Clean Water Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365 (1988); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(l) 
(1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 
U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1988); Solid 
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 and Supp. 
1990); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 
U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8435 (1988); 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(l) 
(1988); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988); Hazardous Liquid Pipeline 
Safety Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. § 2014 (1988). Every major environmental statute except FIFRA 
authorizes a citizen suit. 
12. Its chief rival in this regard is INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See 462 U.S. at 1003-
12 (White, J., dissenting) (appendix). 
13. See supra note 11. 
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citizen in environmental and regulatory law has now been drawn into 
sharp question. 
But the importance of Lujan does not lie only in the invalidation of 
the citizen suit. The decision revises the law of standing in several 
other ways as well. And it raises a host of new puzzles for later cases 
to solve. 
In this article, I have two principal goals. The first is to explain 
why Lujan's invalidation of a congressional grant of standing is a mis-
interpretation of the Constitution. It is now apparently the law that 
Article III forbids Congress from granting standing to "citizens" to 
bring suit. But this view, building on an unfortunate innovation in 
standing law by Justice William 0. Douglas,14 is surprisingly novel. It 
has no support in the text or history of Article III. It is essentially an 
invention of federal judges, and recent ones at that. Certainly it 
should not be accepted by judges who are sincerely committed to the 
original understanding of the Constitution and to judicial restraint. 
Nor should it be accepted by judges who have different approaches to 
constitutional interpretation. 
Lujan holds that the requirement of an "injury in fact" is a limita-
tion on congressional power; but an "injury in fact," as the Court un-
derstands it, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
standing. The relevant question is instead whether the law - gov-
erning statutes, the Constitution, or federal common law - has con-
ferred on the plaintiffs a cause of action.15 An inquiry into "injury in 
14. See the discussion of Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. ISO 
(1970), infra notes 102-13 and accompanying text. 
15. In an often-quoted phrase, Justice Douglas wrote that "[g]eneralizations about standing 
to sue are largely worthless as such." Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 151 (1970). Ifthe analysis here is correct, this generalization is indeed largely worth-
less; but one generalization - that the standing issue depends on the existence of a cause of 
action - is not. This approach to the question of standing is also set out in Lee A. Albert, 
Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate far Claim for Relief, 83 
YALE L.J. 425, 451-55 (1974); David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 
41; William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); David A. Logan, 
Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 37; Cass R. 
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988). In a 
similar vein, see Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation, 59 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984). Many authorities to the same effect are collected in Fletcher, supra, at 
223 n.18. 
The courts have shown a discernible trend in this direction. See Air Courier Conference of 
America v. American Postal Workers Union, Ill S. Ct. 913 (1991); Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Fedn., 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984). Of course 
one could conclude that Article III imposes limits on Congress' power to grant standing but that, 
short of those limits, the standing question is whether Congress or any other source of law con-
fers a cause of action. Perhaps the law will tend in this direction even post-Lujan. See especially 
International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 
1700 (1991), where the Court said that "standing is gauged by the specific common law, statu-
tory or constitutional claims that a party presents," and noted that standing "should be seen as a 
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fact" will both allow standing where it should be denied and deny 
standing where it should be granted. 
More fundamentally, the very notion of "injury in fact" is not 
merely a misinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act16 and 
Article III but also a large-scale conceptual mistake. I hope to show 
that the injury-in-fact requirement should be counted as a prominent 
contemporary version of early twentieth-century substantive due pro-
cess. It uses highly contestable ideas about political theory to invali-
date congressional enactments, even though the relevant constitutional 
text and history do not call for invalidation at all. Just like its early 
twentieth-century predecessor, it injects common law conceptions of 
harm into the Constitution. Moreover, it acts as if injury can be as-
sessed through a purely factual inquiry, rather than one that is inevita-
bly a product of courts' value-laden judgments and of governing legal 
conventions. This deep problem has been obscured by the surprising 
evolution of modem standing principles. 
My second goal is to discuss the many new issues that will arise in 
the aftermath of Lujan. Under what circumstances can citizens now 
prove that they are not mere citizens, but people with the requisite 
"injury" or "personal stake"? How does Lujan affect environmental 
and other regulatory cases? What might Congress do to respond to 
the decision? These will be the key questions in the next decade. They 
will have considerable importance for the development of environmen-
tal law and risk regulation, and indeed for administrative and regula-
tory law in general. 
This article is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly sets out the 
history of the law of standing. Here I discuss the clear acceptance of 
"stranger" or "citizen" suits at the founding period in both England 
and early America. The Lujan Court should not have taken the ex-
traordinary step of invalidating a congressional grant of standing with-
out investigating the relevant history. 
I also describe the very recent creation of the "injury-in-fact" test. 
I will show that, in an exceedingly short period, a revisionist view of 
Article III, with no textual or historical support, has established injury 
in fact as a constitutional prerequisite. I also argue that, despite its 
apparent simplicity, the notion of injury in fact is heavily dependent 
on an assessment of law and is far from a law-free inquiry into facts. 
Part II describes and evaluates the various holdings in the Lujan 
question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory and constitutional provision 
whose protection is invoked." 111 S. Ct. at 1704 (citing Fletcher, supra, at 229). 
16. 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1988). 
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case. I end the Part with two brief detours: a discussion of the role of 
the citizen suit in regulatory law and a general assessment of Justice 
Scalia's conception of Article III, as set out in his 1983 Suffolk Law 
Review article. The overlap between the 1992 Lujan opinion and the 
1983 article is sharp and clear. The overlap makes the article a matter 
of considerable current interest. 
Part III discusses the future of the law of standing in the wake of 
Lujan. Here I try to show exactly which issues are open and which 
closed. One of my major purposes is to explore the effect of Lujan on 
current regulatory cases brought by beneficiaries. of regulatory stat-
utes. I argue that in many such cases standing remains available, but 
that some cases brought by consumers and others are now drawn into 
sharp question. 
In order to overcome some of the uncertainties now facing citizen 
suits, I recommend that Congress create a system of bounties for citi-
zens in cases involving both private defendants and the executive 
branch. Even after Lujan, such a system should raise no constitu-
tional question. Congress may also have the power both to create 
property rights in the benefits provided by regulatory statutes and to 
establish standing to vindicate those property rights. I conclude with 
a discussion of this intriguing possibility. 
I. A CAPSULE HISTORY OF STANDING 
The law of standing has had many remarkable twists and turns. 
For convenience, we might think of American law as evolving through 
five different eras of standing doctrine. We are now in the midst of the 
fifth; its contours remain indistinct. But one of its principal features is 
an insistence that Article III requires injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability - requirements unknown to our law until the 1970s. In 
this Part, I outline the development of standing doctrine.17 
It makes sense to begin with the text of Article III, which extends 
"Judicial Power" to certain specified "Cases" and "Controversies."18 
In the original understanding, "cases" included both civil and criminal 
disputes, whereas "controversies" were limited to civil disputes. 19 Ar-
ticle III contains no explicit constitutional requirement of "standing" 
or "personal stake." Nor does it ever refer to "injury in fact." It does 
require a case or controversy, and very plausibly there is no such thing 
17. Some aspects of this history are also discussed in Sunstein, supra note 15. 
18. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. 
19. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431-32 (1793). 
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without a cause of action. 20 If we are to impose additional standing 
requirements, we must do so on the basis not of text but of history, 
both before and at the time of the framing and through judicial prac-
tice over time.21 
An overview of opinions addressing the issue of standing will help 
illustrate the basic picture. In the history of the Supreme Court, 
standing has been discussed in terms of Article III on 117 occasions. 22 
Of those 117 occasions, 55, or nearly half, of the discussions occurred 
after 1985 - that is, in the past seven years. Of those 117, 71, or over 
two thirds, of the discussions occurred after 1980 - that is, in just 
over a decade. Of those 117, 109, or nearly all, of the discussions oc-
curred since 1965. The first reference to "standing" as an Article III 
limitation can be found in Stark v. Wickard, 23 decided in 1944. The 
next reference does not appear until eight years later, in Adler v. Board 
of Education. 24 Not until the Data Processing case in 197025 did a 
large number of cases emerge on the issue of standing. The explosion 
of judicial interest in standing as a distinct body of constitutional law 
is an extraordinarily recent phenomenon.26 
What of "injury in fact"? No court referred to this phrase before 
Barlow v. Collins 21 in 1970. After that year, the phrase appears in 
about ten cases during each succeeding five-year interval, until a leap 
to ten references in the brief period from 1990 to 1992.28 Thus the 
20. See Akhil R. Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 718 n.154 (1989) (reviewing 
HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Paul M. Bator et al 
eds., 3d ed. 1988)). 
21. The same point is made in Scalia, supra note 1, at 882. 
22. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, US file (July 11, 1992). On the history of the term, see 
Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 1371, 1418-25 (1988). 
23. 321 U.S. 288 (1944). 
24. 342 U.S. 485, 501 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
25. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
26. This evidence is crude because it is consistent with two speculations. (a) Perhaps the 
recency of the particular words obscures the tradition represented by the general concept. (b) 
Perhaps standing has become important only recently as a result of attempts to bring suit by 
people who would never even thought of doing so before. If (a) is true, the evidence tells us 
nothing. If (b) is true, the constitutional limit was always present but did not have to be often 
invoked until recently. 
The discussion in Part I should shed light on these possibilities. For the moment, a few brief 
words. The history suggests that (a) is only partly true. A cause of action has traditionally been 
required, and this requirement is indeed imposed by Article III. But standing, as a distinct body 
of law, represents a genuinely new development, not a traditional one. As Part I also suggests, 
(b) is only partly true as well. Stranger or citizen actions are familiar to English and American 
law. The suit to compel nondiscretionary government action is no innovation; it is part of the old 
idea of mandamus. On the other hand, the modem regulatory state has furnished many more 
occasions for this suit than was traditional. 
27. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
28. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, US file (July 11, 1992). 
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injury-in-fact test played no role in administrative and constitutional 
law until the past quarter century. 
To say this is not to deny that there were important antecedents 
for the requirement of standing. As we will soon see, there had always 
been a question whether the plaintiff had a cause of action, and this 
was indeed a matter having constitutional status. Without a cause of 
action, there was no case or controversy and hence no standing. This 
is an extremely important principle. Moreover, a handful of cases in 
the 1920s and 1930s relied on notions of "standing" without mention-
ing the word. These cases, too, are of considerable importance. But 
we will see that the modem understanding of standing is insufficiently 
self-conscious of its own novelty, even of its revisionism. 
A. English and American Practice 
The first period, by far the longest, ranges from the founding era to 
roughly 1920. In that period, there was no separate standing doctrine 
at all.29 No one believed that the Constitution limited Congress' 
power to confer a cause of action. Instead, what we now consider to 
be the question of standing was answered by deciding whether Con-
gress or any other source of law had granted the plaintiff a right to 
sue. 30 To have standing, a litigant needed a legal right to bring suit. 
The notion of injury in fact did not appear in this period. The 
existence of a concrete, personal interest, or an injury in fact, was 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a legal proceeding. 
People with a concrete interest could not bring suit unless the common 
law, or some other source of law, said so. But if a source of law con-
ferred a right to sue, "standing" existed, entirely independently of 
"concrete interest" or "injury in fact."31 
Implicit in these ideas was a particular conception of Article III 
and a particular understanding of the relationship between Article III 
and standing. If neither Congress nor the common law had conferred 
a right to sue, no case or controversy existed. Whatever harm had 
occurred was not legally cognizable at all; this was a case of damnum 
29. Much of the relevant history emerges from three important essays: Raoul Berger, Stand-
ing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis 
L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 14 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1269-82 
(1961); Winter, supra note 22, at 1394-425. I rely a good deal on these treatments here. 
30. See Winter, supra note 22, at 1395-96 (explaining how this idea was mediated through 
the forms of action); supra note 15. Justice Scalia appears to have recognized this point, subject 
to his Article III caveats, in his 1983 article: "Standing requires ..• the allegation of some 
particularized injury to the individual plaintiff. But legal injury is by definition no more than the 
violation of a legal right; and legal rights can be created by the legislature." Scalia, supra note 1, 
at 885. 
31. See Winter, supra note 22, at 1396. 
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absque injuria. Courts had no power to hear the plaintiff's claim. 
There was therefore a sharp distinction between an injury on the one 
hand (a "harm") and a legal injury on the other. To this extent, the 
Article III requirement of a case or controversy did indeed constrain 
the category of persons who could bring suit. But the constraint had 
everything to do with whether the legislature or some other source of 
law had created a cause of action. It had nothing to do with "injury in 
fact." 
There is no evidence of constitutional limits on the power to grant 
standing. In both England and America, actions by strangers, or by 
citizens in general, were fully permissible and indeed familiar. There 
is no basis for the view that the English and early American concep-
tion of adjudication forbade suits by strangers or citizens. 
1. England 
The practice in England is revealing, for it helps cast light on what 
the founding generation may have understood by "case or contro-
versy." Before and at the time of the framing, the English practice 
was to allow strangers to have standing in the many cases involving 
the ancient prerogative writs. Of these writs, two of the most impor-
tant were certiorari and prohibition. "The English tradition of locus 
standi in prohibition and certiorari is that 'a stranger' has standing, 
but relief in suits by strangers is discretionary."32 
The governing idea behind the writ of prohibition was that a usur-
pation of jurisdiction encroached on the royal prerogative. It followed 
that anyone could bring the writ. 33 A key case was Articuloi Cieri, 
reported by Coke in a passage that would have been familiar to the 
Americans of the late eighteenth century.34 The central passage says: 
"And the kings courts that may award prohibitions, being informed 
either by the parties themselves, or by any stranger, that any court 
temporall or ecclesiasticall doth hold plea of that (whereof they have 
not jurisdiction) may lawfully prohibit the same .... " 35 No English 
court appears to have rejected the view that prohibition was available 
at the behest of strangers. 36 
The writ of certiorari was similarly available to citizens, and not 
just those with a concrete or personal interest. A case in 1724 indi-
32. Jaffe, supra note 29, at 1274. 
33. J.M. EVANS, DE SMITH'S JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINI5fRATIVE ACTION 417 (4th 
ed., 1980); Jaffe, supra note 29, at 1274. 
34. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 602 (1797). 
35. Id. (emphasis added). 
36. See Berger, supra note 29, at 819; Winter, supra note 22, at 1394-95. 
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cated that "one who comes merely as a stranger" was entitled to dis-
cretionary judicial relief. 37 Suits by strangers were also permitted 
under a statute allowing an information of quo warranto. 38 An Eng-
lish case expressly so held in the auspicious year of 1789.39 
There were other English precedents for the citizen suit. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mandamus was available in Eng-
land, even at the behest of strangers.40 Thus Berger writes: 
From such cases a colonial lawyer might well have concluded that man-
damus was capable of issuance at the suit of a stranger who sought to 
assert the public interest, especially because the analogy of mandamus to 
prohibition was early drawn, and because Coke, who had unequivocally 
stated the availability of prohibition to strangers, also made a massive 
assertion of mandamus jurisdiction.41 
The mandamus action is closely related to the modem citizen suit. 
The purpose of the mandamus action is to require the executive 
branch to do what the law requires it to do. This is the same idea that 
underlies the citizen suit, most conspicuously in the environmental 
area. 
Related devices in England were the informers' action and the rela-
tor action. In the informers' action, cash bounties were awarded to 
strangers who successfully prosecuted illegal conduct. In relator ac-
tions, suits would be brought formally in the name of the Attorney 
General, but at the instance of a private person, often a stranger. 
"[A]ny persons, though the most remote in the contemplation of the 
charity, may be relators .... "42 Certiorari and prohibition remain 
available to strangers in England today.43 
The English history is sufficient to show that if we are thinking in 
historical terms, "the argument for a constitutional bar to strangers as 
complainants against unconstitutional action" is "without founda-
tion. "44 The modem injury-in-fact test, developed in the twentieth 
century, attempted to draw on the Westminster practice.45 But 
37. Arthur v. Commissioners of Sewers, 88 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1724); see Berger, supra 
note 29, at 820-21 & n.29. 
38. Berger, supra note 29, at 823. 
39. See Rex v. Smith, 100 Eng. Rep. 740 (K.B. 1790) (discussing Rex v. Brown); see also 
Berger, supra note 29, at 823 & n.38 (noting that Rex v. Brown, decided in 1789, allowed stran-
gers to enforce acts of Parliament, as such acts were of interest to all in "the kingdom"), 
40. Berger, supra note 29, at 824-25. 
41. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
42. Attorney Gen. v. Bucknall, 26 Eng. Rep. 600 (Ch. 1741). 
43. Berger, supra note 29, at 823. 
44. Id. at 827. 
45. Thus Justice Frankfurter wrote: 
[A] court will not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the kind of 
injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial determination 
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enough has been said to show that this is a historical blunder. 
2. America, the Qui Tam Action, and Others 
173 
There is relatively little explicit material on the Framers' concep-
tion of "case or controversy."46 Certainly there is no direct evidence 
that injury in fact or concrete interest was intended to be a constitu-
tional prerequisite under Article III. There is no reason to think that 
the Framers sought to limit Congress' power to create "cases" or 
"controversies" by conferring causes of action.47 To understand what 
the Americans understood, it is useful to consult the early American 
practice, looking at the state and federal levels. 
If we look at the practice in state courts, we will find no reason to 
th.ink that the American practice was more restrictive than that in 
England. Several state cases built explicitly on the English practice. 
For example, a South Carolina court issued a writ of prohibition at the 
behest of a stranger.4s A New Jersey case in 1794 established stranger 
jurisdiction in certiorari, effectively allowing a citizen action.49 An-
other New Jersey case issued a writ of certiorari on behalf of a citizen 
and expressly rejected the view that the "court ought not to award a 
certiorari on the mere prayer of an individual, unless he will previously 
lay some cause before them tending to show that he is or may be af-
fected by the operation of the by-law ... . "so 
Other cases in the first century of the republic suggested the same 
view.51 Thus Louis Jaffe summarized his historical survey with the 
is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial courts and the 
courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed. 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McCJrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
46. Most of it is collected in 4 PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' 
CONSTITUTION 212-373 (1987). 
47. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163-64 (1803) (exploring whether the 
right to a cominission is something which the laws of the United States cannot enforce: 
In pursuing this inquiry, the first question which presents itself, is, whether this can be 
arranged with that class of cases which come under the description of damnun absque in-
juria - a loss without an injury. 
This description of cases never has been considered, and it is believed never can be con-
sidered, as comprehending offices of trust, of honor or of profit. The office of justice of peace 
in the district of Columbia is such an office; it is therefore worthy of the attention and 
guardianship of the laws. It has received that attention and guardianship. It has been cre-
ated by special act of congress, and has been secured, so far as the laws can give security to 
the person appointed to fill it, for five years. It is not then on account of the worthlessness of 
the thing pursued, that the injured party can be alleged to be without remedy.). 
48. Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 398 (1794). 
49. State v. Justices of Middlesex, 1 N.J.L. 283, 294 (1794). 
50. State v. Corporation of New Brunswick, 1 N.J.L. 450, 451 (1795). 
51. See Jaffe, supra note 29, at 1276-79. Jaffe notes that this position has survived to the 
present day. "The considerable weight of authority now supports the citizen-mandamus suit." 
Id. at 1276 & n.44. 
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suggestion that "the public action - an action brought by a private 
person primarily to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of 
public obligations - has long been a feature of our English and Amer-
ican law."52 
At the national level, there is no clear American tradition of reli-
ance on the prerogative writs. According to the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the All Writs Act,53 Congress did not choose explicitly 
to create general mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari jurisdiction, 
though there were particular statutory and common law cases involv-
ing the writs, and it seems clear that their limited use was a matter of 
legislative discretion rather than constitutional command.54 There 
are, however, revealing early precedents for the citizen suit at the na-
tional level. The writ of prohibition to restrain an allegedly unconsti-
tutional tax was treated as a constitutional case in a relatively early 
decision of the Marshall Court,55 and in 1875 the Supreme Court al-
lowed a petition for mandamus at the behest of what it treated as citi-
zens. In Union Pacific Railroad v. Hall 56 merchants brought suit to 
require a federally chartered railroad to create a certain railroad line. 
They invoked a general mandamus statute "to compel the Union Pa-
cific Railroad Company to operate its road as required by law."57 The 
Court said that the merchants were attempting to enforce "a duty to 
the public generally" and that they "had no interest other than such as 
belonged to others."58 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court allowed the 
action to go forward. 
Moreover, the early Congress was active as well. I believe that 
Congress supplied two precedents - the qui tam action and the in-
formers' action - that operate as a powerful affirmative argument 
52. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 15 HARV. L. REV. 
255, 302 (1961). After the founding period, the American law took on a predictably complex 
and somewhat exotic form, with rules of its own. See FRANK GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OP 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 418-41 (1905). For the modern rules, see 2 
CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF ExTRAORDINARY REMEDIES (1987), discussing pro· 
hibition, quo warranto, and certiorari. Although many modern American courts generally re-
quire a personal stake of some kind, this requirement is far from universal. See, e.g., id. at 622-24 
(describing citizen and taxpayer standing in Georgia, Hawaii, and New Jersey). 
53. 28 u.s.c. § 1651 (1988). 
54. The Supreme Court denied general mandamus jurisdiction, but did so on the theory that 
Congress had not chosen to act, not that there was any Article III issue. Thus the Court con-
cluded that the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 811-82 (1848), did not vest general 
mandamus power in the federal courts. See Mcintire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 505·06 
(1813); see also Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 569, 577-79 (1838). 
55. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 171 (1829). 
56. 91 U.S. 343 (1875). For an especially good discussion of this case, see Winter, supra note 
22, at 1404-05. 
57. 91 U.S. at 343. 
58. 91 U.S. at 354. 
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against the view that Article III bars "stranger" or "citizen" actions 
once these have been congressionally authorized. 
The most important development was the widespread early con-
gressional creation of the qui tam action. The purpose of this action is 
to give citizens a right to bring civil suits to help in the enforcement of 
the federal criminal law. Under the qui tam action, a citizen - who 
might well be a stranger - is permitted to bring suits against offenders 
of the law. Qui tam actions are familiar to American law. "Statutes 
providing for actions by a common informer, who himself has no in-
terest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, 
have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this 
country ever since the foundation of our Government. "59 In the first 
decade of the nation's existence, Congress created a number of qui tam 
actions. 60 Explicit qui tam provisions were allowed under many stat-
utes, including those criminalizing the import of liquor without paying 
duties, 61 prohibiting certain trade with Indian tribes, 62 criminalizing 
failure to comply with certain postal requirements, 63 and criminalizing 
slave trade with foreign nations. 64 
The qui tam action was accompanied by the informers' action. 
Through this action, people can bring suit to enforce public duties; 
successful plaintiffs keep a share of the resulting damages or fines. In 
the states, this action had become familiar in the early stages of Amer-
ican history. Notably, the informers' action was available against both 
private defendants and public officials. 65 Early Congresses created at 
least two informers' actions to assist in the enforcement of federal law. 
The first of these operated not only against private violators but 
against executive officials as well. 66 "Suits by those without personal 
injury who were acting as representatives of others were not viewed as 
raising constitutional problems under article IIl."67 
For present purposes, what is especially revealing is that there is 
59. United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) (quoting Marvin v. 
Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905)). 
60. There is a valuable discussion in Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law 
Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 275, 296-303 (1989), and I draw 
on that discussion here. See also Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 
YALE L.J. 341 (1989). 
61. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209. 
62. Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 18, 1 Stat. 469, 474. 
63. Act. of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 25, 1 Stat. 232, 239. 
64. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 347, 349. 
65. See Winter, supra note 22, at 1406-09 & nn.189-91. 
66. See Act of July 31, 1989, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 45; see also Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 
§ 5, 1 Stat. 275, 277-78. 
67. Winter, supra note 22, at 1409. 
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no evidence that anyone at the time of the framing believed that a qui 
tam action or informers' action produced a constitutional doubt. No 
one thought to suggest that the "case or controversy" requirement 
placed serious constraints on what was, in essence, a citizen suit. This 
fact provides extremely powerful evidence that Article III did not im-
pose constraints on Congress' power to grant standing to strangers. 
There are two possible differences between the qui tam and inform-
ers' actions on the one hand and the modem citizen suit on the other. 
First, the former are usually brought against a private defendant. By 
contrast, the government is often the defendant in the citizen suit, as 
indeed it was in Lujan itself. If the requirement of injury is to be read 
in light of constitutional provisions relating to executive power, 68 then 
the existence of the qui tam and informers' actions may not be decisive 
as against the claim that citizen or stranger suits are constitutionally 
forbidden. 
Second, the victor in a qui tam action is ordinarily entitled to re-
cover money to be paid to himself, to the United States, or to both. 
The victor in an informers' action also receives some financial benefit. 
By contrast, the victor in a citizen action does not recover money. For 
this reason it is not completely odd to think that, as originally under-
stood, the Constitution permitted stranger actions only if dollars were 
to change hands. 
These are not entirely implausible distinctions. But if they are set 
out as part of an argument that Article III forbids the citizen suit, they 
do make for quite a stretch. Most important, the informers' action 
was available against public as well as private defendants at the state 
and federal levels. It cannot be distinguished on the ground that it 
operated only against private defendants. Nor should it matter that 
money does not change hands. The history suggests that the bounty is 
designed to offer an incentive, not to create an injury where none ex-
isted before. A declaratory judgment or an injunction serves the same 
purposes as a victorious suit in a qui tam or informers' action. Indeed, 
mandamus suits did not involve money at all, and these too were ac-
cepted during the early period. 69 
More generally, if the stranger suit was thought constitutionally 
problematic, in all probability some constitutional concern would have 
been voiced about the qui tam action or the informers' action. The 
absence of any concern about these actions makes it exceedingly un-
likely that the case or controversy requirement was believed to place 
68. See infra text accompanying notes 145-47. 
69. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
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any constraints on Congress' ability to grant causes of action to 
strangers. 70 
The Constitution may require courts to impose greater constraints 
on standing when the executive is the defendant.71 But if an "injury in 
fact" is required by Article III, it should not matter a great deal 
whether the defendant is public or private. Hence the qui tam and 
informers' actions do seem to be powerful evidence against the claim 
that an injury in fact is an Article III requirement. 
3. Summary 
The discussion thus far has shown that early English and Ameri-
can practices give no support to the view that the Constitution limits 
Congress' power to create standing. The relevant practices suggest not 
that everyone has standing, nor that Article III allows standing for all 
injuries, but instead something far simpler and less exotic: people have 
standing if the law has granted them a right to bring suit. There is no 
authority to the contrary before the twentieth century, and, indeed, I 
think that there is no such authority before World War II.72 
A general picture emerges from the words of the great administra-
tive law teacher Frank Goodnow, writing in 1905. Goodnow's exten-
sive treatise has no discussion of standing, then a foreign concept; but 
it does deal with the prerogative writs in America. Describing what 
had come to be the American practice, Goodnow wrote: 
The purpose of the writs is twofold. In the first place, they are issued 
mainly with the intention of protecting private rights; in the second 
place, some of them may be made use of also for the purpose of the 
maintenance of the law regardless of the fact whether in the particular 
case a private right is attacked or not. Thus in the case of the certiorari it 
has been held that this writ may not be made use of simply for the main-
tenance of the law, that no one may apply for it unless he has some 
particular interest in its issue which is greater than that possessed by the 
ordinary citizen. The courts, however, have held with regard to the quo 
warranto that it may be issued on the demand of any citizen of responsi-
bility,- and the better rule would seem to be that in matters of public con-
cern any citizen or taxpayer may apply for the mandamus.73 
In this light, is it even possible to argue that the case or contro-
versy requirement forbids the citizen action? Perhaps the English 
cases are not decisive, since the case-or-controversy requirement was 
70. The notion of "stranger" is in fact problematic in this context, for the cause of action 
makes the litigant the holder of a kind of property right. See infra notes 130-32 and accompany-
ing text. 
71. The point is discussed infra text accompanying notes 145-47. 
72. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text. 
73. GOODNOW, supra note 52, at 431-32 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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not present in English law. That requirement might even be seen as a 
check on certain suits cognizable in England. Nor is the American 
practice completely unambiguous. The prerogative writs were not 
generally available at the behest of strangers in the federal courts. As 
noted, the qui tam action operated against private persons, and money 
would always change hands. It might therefore remain possible to ar-
gue that Article III indeed requires a "personal stake" or an "injury in 
fact" because, in the United States, federal courts were not tradition-
ally given jurisdiction in pure citizen suits. 
The history does not completely foreclose this argument, but it 
does make the argument seem far-fetched. There is absolutely no af-
firmative evidence that Article III was intended to limit congressional 
power to create standing. There is no affirmative evidence of a re-
quirement of a "personal stake" or an "injury in fact" - beyond the 
genuine requirement that some source of law confer a cause of action. 
Nor is there reason to believe that the case-or-controversy requirement 
was designed to draw sharper limits than existed in English law. The 
general unavailability of the prerogative writs in federal court was a 
matter of legislative discretion, not constitutional compulsion. 74 It is 
at the very least highly suggestive that no one seemed to think that the 
qui tam or informers' action raised an Article III issue. In light of all 
this, the claim that Article III bars citizen standing - once Congress 
has created it - seems most adventurous as a matter of history. 
It would be possible to respond that particular historical under-
standings are not always binding in constitutional law. Segregation is 
unconstitutional even if the framers did not intend to abolish it;75 in 
the Due Process Clause, the meaning of "liberty" changes over time; 76 
the Contracts Clause has been understood to be far narrower than 
originally conceived. 77 Perhaps Article III should be treated the same 
way; perhaps we should not be bound by the framers' particular con-
ception of its meaning. 
The general point about constitutional interpretation seems cor-
rect, but it does not justify the view that Article III prohibits Congress 
from granting standing to citizens. When the specific understandings 
are not binding, it is because the framers are taken to have set out a 
general principle capable of change over time, or because changed cir-
cumstances call for a departure from historically specific understand-
74. See supra note 54. 
75. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
76. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
77. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
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ings. 78 In Article III, the general principle is that a case cannot exist 
unless some source of law creates a cause of action. It is hard to un-
derstand why this principle should be abandoned in the context of a 
citizen suit. 79 
B. The Initial Appearance of ''Standing'~· The Progressive 
and New Deal Periods 
The second stage of standing law occurred in the early parts of this 
century. It was here that "standing" began to make a modest initial 
emergence as a discrete body of doctrine. To understand this develop-
ment, a little background is in order. 
The preliminary development of standing doctrine should be un-
derstood as part and parcel of the heated struggle, in the 1920s and 
1930s, within the country and the courts about the constitutional legit-
imacy of the emerging regulatory state. Courts frequently invoked the 
Constitution as a barrier to regulatory law.80 Justices Brandeis and 
Frankfurter were, in their somewhat different periods, the leading ex-
ponents of the view that courts should defer to the outcomes of demo-
cratic processes. 
In this light, it should come as no surprise that the principal early 
architects of what we now consider standing limits were Justices Bran-
deis and Frankfurter. 81 Their goal was to insulate progressive and 
New Deal legislation from frequent judicial attack. Attempting to 
counter the aggressive Supreme Court of the period, Justices Brandeis 
and Frankfurter helped develop a range of devices designed to limit 
the occasions for judicial intervention into democratic processes. 
78. Brown exemplifies both these points. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. 
79. I do not contend that there are no limits to Congress' power to decide what is a "case" or 
"controversy." In all likelihood, for example, Congress is barred from overcoming the ban on 
advisory opinions. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 86 (2d ed. 1991). 
This ban is a plausible inference from the "Opinions in Writing" Clause, which allows the Presi-
dent to require opinions from heads of departments, but not from judges. U.S. CoNST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 1. Moreover, the notion of a "case," as historically understood, excludes the judicial 
provision of advice at the behest of public officials. Outside of the distinctive area of standing, 
then, there are barriers to Congress' power to create a "case" where one did not exist before. In 
very rare cases, there may even be barriers to the congressional conferral of standing for separa-
tion-of-powers reasons. Consider, for example, a grant of standing to all members of Congress to 
challenge all executive action. I do not deal with such exotic examples here. See also Hayburn's 
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (refusing to adjudicate case where judicial decision is subject to 
executive suspension and legislative revision). 
80. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573-74 nn. 23-25 (2d ed. 1988) (collecting cases). The con-
nection between the New Deal and the development of standing doctrine is traced in illuminating 
detail in Winter, supra note 22, at 1452-57, and briefly discussed in Sunstein, supra note 15, at 
1437-38. 
81. See Winter, supra note 22, at 1443-52. 
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In the key cases, they repudiated constitutional attacks on legisla-
tive and administrative action by invoking justiciability doctrines. 82 
Prominent among these doctrines was the requirement of what we 
now think of as standing. 83 The crucial cases involved efforts by citi-
zens at large to invoke the Constitution to invalidate democratic out-
comes. 84 In such cases, the Court held that there was no personal 
stake for the invocation of judicial power. 
How are we to understand these cases? We might begin by asking 
whether there was any source of a cause of action. In each case, no 
common law right was at stake. In addition, no statute created a right 
to bring suit. Finally, it seemed implausible to suggest, in these cases, 
that the relevant constitutional provision created a private right of ac-
tion. The very notion that private rights of action - or standing -
could be created by constitutional provisions was many years away.85 
Even if some constitutional provisions created private rights, it seemed 
hard to accept the view that provisions in these cases did so, because 
the relevant duties could not be individuated and seemed to run to the 
public at large. I take up this matter below. 86 
The development of standing limitations in the early part of the 
twentieth century was indeed a novelty, in the sense that no separate 
body of standing law existed before this period. Notably, the relevant 
opinions did not even refer to the word standing. But we might well 
see the Brandeis-Frankfurter innovations as broadly compatible with 
preexisting law. For the most part, their opinions can be read to hold 
that no one has a right to sue unless some law has conferred a right to 
do so. In the cases in which the cause of action was denied, no such 
right had been conferred. This was the key point in the relevant 
opinions. 87 
82. See Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (reviewability); 
FCC v. CBS, 311 U.S. 132 (1940) (same); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 
(1938) (reviewability and ripeness). 
83. See, e.g., Joint Anti·Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341-45 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922); see also Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 
24, 30-31 (1907) (refusing to enjoin payments by U.S. government for construction of Panama 
Canal as plaintiff demonstrated no interest and such relief "would be an exercise of judicial 
power which ... is novel and extraordinary"). It is especially notable that Justice Brandeis' great 
opinion in Ashwander - the modem source of justiciability doctrine - does not refer to Article 
III at all. See Winter, supra note 22, at 1424. 
84. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479-80 (1923); Winter, supra note 22, at 
1424; infra text accompanying notes 212-14. 
85. See Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
86. See infra text accompanying notes 215-18. 
87. See infra text accompanying notes 212-21. Some of the cases, most prominently Mellon, 
262 U.S. at 486-88, did express doubt about citizen or taxpayer standing, though not in the 
context of an express congressional grant. 
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As noted above, the requirement of a cause of action is indeed a 
command both of Article III and of tradition. 88 The relevant denials 
of standing were therefore properly based on the plaintiffs' inability to 
find a law that entitled them to sue. Thus the Supreme Court could 
write as late as 1939 that, to have standing, a plaintiff must have a 
"legal right - one of property, one arising out of contract, one pro-
tected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which 
confers a privilege."89 
C. The Administrative Procedure Act 
The third period in the development of standing consists of the 
enactment and interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) in 1946.90 The relevant provision of the APA was an effort to 
codify the developing body of judge-made standing law: "A person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof."91 This apparently cryptic phrase 
was actually designed to recognize standing in three straightforward 
categories of cases. All three categories had become well-established 
under previous law.92 
First, people could obtain standing by showing that they suffered a 
"legal wrong" because a common law interest was at stake. An inva-
sion of a common law interest would certainly qualify as a legal 
wrong. Courts presumed that anyone who could show such an inva-
sion would be entitled to bring suit. This idea had constitutional foun-
dations, to the extent that a foreclosure of standing to people with 
common law interests might raise problems under the Due Process 
Clause or Article III. 93 
Second, plaintiffs could show that they suffered a legal wrong 
within the meaning of AP A by demonstrating that their statutory in-
88. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31. 
89. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). 
90. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 423, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
59, 701-06 (1988)). 
91. 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1988). 
92. See UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947): "The Attorney General advised the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary of his understanding that section lO(a) was a restatement of existing Jaw .... 
This construction of section lO(a) was not questioned or contradicted in the legislative history." 
Id. at 96 (footnote omitted); see also Richard Stewart, The Refonnation of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1723-47 (1975); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1438-40. 
93. See Yakus v. United States, 321U.S.414, 431-35 (1944) (discussing due process issue but 
finding no violation as statute in question provided reasonable opportunity to challenge its valid-
ity); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 40-41 (1932) (finding no due process or Article III violation 
as remedies provided in statute approximated probable judicial damages). 
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terests were at stake. For example, if the interest of a litigant in com-
petition on equal terms was a relevant factor under the governing 
statute - if the agency was required to take that factor into account 
- the litigant would have standing to bring suit to vindicate its inter-
est. Congress need not have expressly conferred standing on the plain-
tiff; under the AP A, the mere existence of an interest protected by 
statute was sufficient.94 The APA's framers paid little attention to the 
question how far this approach would extend standing to beneficiaries 
and competitors, though it seems clear that standing was not merely 
contemplated for objects. 9s 
The third category did not involve legal wrong at all. People could 
bring suit if they could show that "a relevant statute" - a statute 
other than the AP A - granted them standing by providing that peo-
ple "adversely affected or aggrieved" were entitled to bring suit. In 
this way, the APA recognized that Congress had allowed people to 
have causes of action, and hence standing, even if their interests were 
not entitled to consideration by the relevant agency. Such people 
could act as "private attorneys general." This had already occurred 
under the Federal Communications Act.96 The APA thus provided 
for congressional authorization of actions by people lacking legal 
injuries. 
This, then, was the AP A framework: standing for people whose 
common law or statutory interests were at stake, as well as for people 
expressly authorized to bring suit under statutes other than the AP A. 
Under the AP A, there was considerable continuity with previous law, 
in the sense that the principal question, for purposes of standing, was 
whether the law had conferred a cause of action. Injury in fact was 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient element. 
94. See The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 266-69 (1924); SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, s. Doc. No. 248, 
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 276 (1946): "The phrase 'legal wrong' •.. means that something more than 
mere adverse personal effect must be shown in order to prevail - that is, that the adverse effect 
must be an illegal effect." 
I will not discuss here the question how to interpret statutes that are ambiguous on the exist-
ence of a private cause of action. For present purposes, the key point is that the AP A did not 
require an explicit grant, but instead inferred a cause of action (standing) from the existence of an 
interest that the agency was entitled to consider. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92; see also Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1440-51 
(discussing the APA and beneficiary standing). 
96. See 41 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1988); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-
77 (1940). 
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D. From ''Legal Injury" to "Injury in Fact" 
The fourth stage of standing law spanned from the early 1960s un-
til about 1975. It included several dramatic new departures. 
1. Beneficiary Suits 
The shift in this fourth period began when courts interpreted the 
"legal wrong,, test to allow many people affected by government deci-
sions - including beneficiaries of regulatory programs - to bring suit 
to challenge government action. For example, courts concluded that 
displaced urban residents, listeners of radio stations, and users of the 
environment could proceed against the government to redress an 
agency's legally insufficient regulatory protection.97 To understand 
these developments, a little background is again in order. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, observers of regulatory law claimed that 
congressional purposes could be undermined not merely by excessive 
regulation, but also by insufficient regulation or agency hostility to 
statutory programs.98 H conformity to law was a goal of administra-
tive law, there was no reason to distinguish between the beneficiaries 
and the objects of regulation. Suits brought by beneficiaries might well 
serve to promote agency fidelity to legislative enactments. 
In the same period, there was also a good deal of empirical litera-
ture suggesting that agencies were sometimes subject to sustained 
97. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932-37 (2d Cir. 1968); 
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Then-Judge Burger wrote, in an influential passage: 
The theory that the [FCC] can always effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal 
proceeding without the aid and participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling 
the role of private attorneys general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work 
with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, 
that it is no longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experi-
ence, neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it. The gradual expansion and 
evolution of concepts of standing in administrative law attests that experience rather than 
logic or fixed rules has been accepted as the guide. 
United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003-04. 
The general idea that courts might review unlawful inaction was hardly inconsistent with the 
APA as originally understood. See U.S. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMl'ITEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, s. Doc. No. 8, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941): 
[T]he problem of whether the administrator's refusal to take action is reviewable still re-
mains. • . • In some instances review may be unavailing because the determination of 
whether or not action should be taken in the circumstances may have been committed to the 
exclusive judgment of the administrator as to the public interest and convenience. But if the 
denial is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, judicial review is available to remove at 
least that barrier. 
Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
98. Much of this is catalogued in JAMES FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGmMACY (1976) and 
Stewart, supra note 92, at 1682-87. 
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political pressure from regulated industries.99 The result was agency 
"capture." Through this process, statutory enactments could be de-
feated during implementation, principally as a result of the continuous 
exercise of power by well-organized private groups, or "factions." 
Collective action problems faced by the often-diffuse members of the 
beneficiary class made it hard for them to exert the same kind of con-
tinuous influence on government. Just as unorganized interests would 
be at a systemic disadvantage in economic ordering, so they would 
face serious problems in the political process. Government failure 
would therefore mimic market failure. 
This account was extremely influential in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
it has continuing popularity today. 100 But it should not be overdrawn. 
The empirical literature did not establish a systemic risk of adminis-
trative abdication, and it did not demonstrate that regulated industries 
are always in a better position to influence government than benefi-
ciaries. Sometimes the opposite seemed true. 101 But the empirical 
literature was sufficient to cast into severe doubt the idea that regula-
tory objects, and not beneficiaries, should have access to judicial re-
view. That idea seemed to stem from partisan considerations or 
judicial hostility to regulatory programs enacted by Congress; it did 
not appear to have any better pedigree. In view of the empirical evi-
dence, it seemed positively perverse to grant standing to objects and 
not to beneficiaries. Thus it was that the legal injury test came, quite 
naturally and plausibly, to be read to allow standing for beneficiaries, 
who often faced statutory harm - "legal injury" - by virtue of inade-
quate regulatory action. 
These modest expansions in standing were entirely compatible 
with the language and framework of the AP A. They built on the 
"legal wrong" idea to grant standing to many individuals and groups 
intended to be benefited by statutory enactments. It was fully reason-
able to think that the beneficiaries of regulation suffered a legal injury 
when government failed to protect their legal interests. But a huge 
99. MANCUR OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECflVE AcrtON: PUBLIC GOOD AND THE THE· 
ORY OF GROUPS (1971), is the best-known general overview. See also RUSSELL HARDIN, CoL-
LECflVE AcrtoN (1982). For an important study addressing the "capture" phenomenon, see 
MARVIN H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955). For 
general discussion, see THE PoLmcs OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); PAUL J. 
QUIRK, INDUSfRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981); KAYE LEHMAN 
SCHLOZMAN & JAMES T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(1986). 
100. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong 
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986). 
101. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN· 
MENT 18-20 (1971). 
November 1992] Standing After Lujan 185 
and far less justified conceptual break occurred in Justice William 0. 
Douglas' opinion for the Court in Association of Data Processing Orga-
nizations v. Camp, 102 which provides the basic underpinnings for the 
modem law of standing. In Data Processing, the Court essentially jet-
tisoned the entire framework of the AP A, even as it purported to in-
terpret that very statute. 
In a remarkably sloppy opinion, the Data Processing Court con-
cluded that a plaintiff no longer needed to show a "legal interest" or 
"legal injury" to establish standing. That test "goes to the merits. 
The question of standing is different."103 Instead of a careful examina-
tion of the governing law to see if Congress had created a legal inter-
est, the standing inquiry would be a simple one barely related to the 
underlying law. Henceforth the issue would tum on facts, not on law. 
In the new test, standing existed for anyone who could show (a) 
"injury in fact, economic or otherwise"104 and (b) injury "arguably ... 
within the zone of interests"105 of the regulatory statute. The zone-of-
interests test was intended to be exceptionally lenient106 and for pres-
ent purposes may be put to one side.107 The result of Data Processing 
was thus an entirely new focus for determining the class of persons 
entitled to bring suit. The Court appeared fully to endorse the 1960s 
expansions in the legal interest test; under its new test, beneficiaries of 
regulatory programs would generally have standing. But they no 
longer were required to show any legal interest. Instead they had to 
show an injury in fact. 
One might well ask: What was the source of the injury-in-fact test? 
Did the Supreme Court just make it up? The answer is basically 
yes. 108 The concept of "injury in fact" first arose in a 1958 treatise by 
102. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
103. 397 U.S. at 153. 
104. 397 U.S. at 152. 
105. 397 U.S. at 156. 
106. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154-55 (noting instances where standing exists). 
107. There has, however, been a recent rebirth in the zone-of-interests test - unintended in 
Data Processing, but perhaps presaging a partial return to the legal interest test. Thus the first 
Supreme Court case denying standing on zone-of-interest grounds came in 1991. See Air Courier 
Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991). If the analysis in 
this essay is right, this development should be enthusiastically welcomed as a return to the cor-
rect understanding of the AP A and Article III. 
108. Here I agree entirely with Justice Scalia. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 887-89. Others 
have also rejected the conclusion that the AP A requires an injury in fact. The most famous is 
Louis L. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 636 (1971); see also Fletcher, supra note 
15, at 229 ("More damage to the intellectual structure of the law of standing can be traced to 
Data Processing than to any other single decision."); Richard Stewart, Standing for Solidarity, 88 
YALE L.J. 1559, 1569 (1979) (book review) (describing Data Processing as an "unredeemed 
disaster"). 
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Kenneth Culp Davis, purporting to interpret the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.109 Davis relied on the AP A's "adversely affected or ag-
grieved" language in support of this conclusion. In his view, someone 
is "adversely affected" if he suffers an injury "in fact."110 
For reasons set forth above, this was a misreading of the AP A; the 
language and history of that statute suggested no such renovation of 
standing law. 111 The words "adversely affected or aggrieved" are not 
freestanding, but are followed by "within the meaning of a relevant 
statute." This juxtaposition shows that Congress was thinking of 
other laws that created private attorneys general.112 But Davis' mis-
reading received an authoritative endorsement in Data Processing. 
The Court's opinion was opaque on the connection between injury in 
fact and Article III. The test seemed to stem from the AP A, but the 
opinion can be read to suggest that Article III is also highly 
relevant. 113 
2. Conceptual Confusion, the New Deal, and the 
Metaphysics of ''Injury" 
Data Processing was poorly written, because it left obscure the rela-
tionship between standing and Article III, and more fundamentally 
because it did not explain the legal source of its novel, indeed unprece-
dented approach to standing. In its basic orientation, however, Data 
Processing reflected the emerging and highly tenable view, reflected in 
more plausible interpretations of the AP A, that saw regulatory benefi-
ciaries as suffering "legal injuries."114 The case thus bears some re-
semblance to the lower court opinions on that point, opinions that 
could claim to rest on the basic AP A framework. I ts 
a. Beneficiaries as objects, objects as beneficiaries. I have sug-
gested that the emerging principles of standing could be associated 
with a particular belief about what caused administrative failure. The 
grant of beneficiary standing stemmed in part from understandings 
about the diffuse and disorganized character of the class of regulatory 
beneficiaries. If the beneficiaries had no greater influence than the ob-
109. 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 22.02, at 211-13 (1958). 
110. Id. After Data Processing. Davis argued that injury in fact should be the principal test 
of standing in Kenneth C. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 471-
73 (1970). 
111. See supra section I.C. 
112. Currie, supra note 15, at 43-44; see also Scalia, supra note 1, at 887; Stewart, supra note 
92, at 1725-30. 
113. See the somewhat confusing passage, 397 U.S. at 151-52. 
114. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also Stewart, supra note 92, at 1735. 
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jects, and often even less, it seemed odd to say that the objects would 
be the only ones entitled to seek judicial review. 
In a deeper sense, however, we might understand the grant of 
standing to regulatory beneficiaries as a broad judicial effort to adapt 
administrative law to the principles and aspirations of the modem 
state. The New Deal reformation of the American legal system would 
ultimately make it impossible and indeed hubristic for courts to say 
that the "objects" of regulation, equipped with common law interests, 
would receive greater protection than the beneficiaries, equipped with 
statutory interests. The New Deal had itself been a wholesale attack 
on the idea that common law interests deserved special constitutional 
status.116 Under the New Deal view, the common law was a regula-
tory system that should be evaluated pragmatically, in terms of 
whether it served human liberty and welfare. When it failed to do so, 
the system had to be supplemented or replaced. 
The New Deal, of course, produced a number of new measures 
designed to protect new interests and to regulate unfair and deceptive 
trade practices, the securities market, and much more.117 The result-
ing set of legislative and administrative initiatives generally reflected a 
democratic judgment that the new interests now protected by statute 
- the interests of consumers, listeners, poor people, and so forth -
should receive no less protection than the interests traditionally pro-
tected by the common law. 
By repudiating the distinction between objects and beneficiaries, 
the new law of standing served to adapt traditional administrative doc-
trines to the nature and aspirations of modem government. In the 
context of standing, the reluctance to take this step has been embodied 
in a private law model of standing - that is, in the idea that standing 
should be reserved principally to people with common law interests 
and denied to people without such interests. This idea reflects a Loch-
ner-like conception of public law. 118 It defines modem public law by 
reference to common law principles that appear nowhere in the 
Constitution. 
The private law model of standing is based on understandings that 
are not only without constitutional foundation, but that seemed to be 
foreclosed by democratic judgments following the New Deal. Indeed, 
that model seemed to draw upon the discredited view that common 
law and laissez-faire principles are part of the Constitution, to be 
116. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION ch. 2 (forthcoming 1993). 
117. See THEODORE LoWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT 44-66 (1985). 
118. On injury in fact as a form of disguised substantive due process, see Fletcher, supra note 
15, at 233. 
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deployed by unelected judges as the vehicle for the definition of a sys-
tem of public law sharply opposed to modem regulatory institutions. 
We can go even further. After the New Deal, the very distinction 
between regulatory beneficiaries and regulatory objects seemed based 
on a conceptual mistake. That distinction treated the common law as 
the normal and natural state of affairs; it saw a deviation from the 
common law as an intrusion on some "object," and as a protection of 
some "beneficiary." Indeed, the definition of the "object" and the 
"beneficiary" was parasitic on common law. But this was a way for 
courts to load the dice. Indeed, this understanding was no longer con-
sistent with the practices and values of modem government. 
The so-called regulatory objects were in fact beneficiaries of law, 
insofar as it was law - statutory or common - that conferred on 
them the set of entitlements that created a protected sphere of action. 
Suppose, for example, that an industry attempted to fend off an occu-
pational safety regulation that it believed unlawful. The industry's rel-
evant rights were legal ones, and these established it as a "beneficiary" 
of positive law. Similarly, the beneficiaries of regulation could equally 
be seen as "objects" of law insofar as it was the law - statutory or 
common - that authorized private and public intrusions on their in-
terests. Workers, for example, were the "objects" of the common law 
insofar as that law enabled employers to exclude them from the em-
ployer's land whenever employers so chose.119 The rise of the regula-
tory state rendered the distinction between regulatory objects and 
regulatory beneficiaries a conceptual anachronism, a relic of the Loch-
ner period. 
b. The impossibility of "injury [solely] in fact." There is a related 
and even deeper conceptual issue, connected with the notion of injury 
in fact, and bearing both on the current discussion and on the develop-
ments culminating in Lujan. The Data Processing Court appears to 
have thought that it was greatly simplifying matters by shifting from a 
complex inquiry of law (is there a legal injury?) to an exceedingly sim-
ple, law-free inquiry into fact (is there a factual harm?). That Court, 
and its successors (the Lujan Court among them), seem to assume that 
whether there is an "injury" can be answered as if it were a purely 
factual matter - as if the existence of injury depended on some brute 
fact, not on evaluation, and not on law. But this is false. 120 
In classifying some harms as injuries in fact and other harms as 
119. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 
309·15 (1991) (arguing that property law invades negative rights of the homeless). 
120. See Fletcher's fine discussion to this effect, supra note 15, at 231-34, from which I draw 
here. 
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purely ideological, 121 courts must inevitably rely on some standard 
that is normatively laden and independent of facts. If the point seems 
obscure, it is only because there are reasonably well-established con-
ventions on what counts as an injury, and these conventions tend to 
disguise the normative judgments and make them seem purely factual. 
But in every case, the person who brings a lawsuit believes that she has 
indeed suffered an injury in fact. 
When blacks challenge a grant of tax deductions to segregated 
schools, they believe that the grant is an injury in fact, not that it is 
purely ideological.122 When an environmentalist complains about the 
destruction of a pristine area, he believes that the loss of that area is 
indeed an injury to him. When we deny these claims, we are making a 
judgment based not on any fact, but instead on an inquiry into what 
should count as a judicially cognizable injury. This judgment may be 
right, but it has little to do with facts or concreteness. 
As stated, my claim may seem obscure, even exotic. It is tempting 
to respond that there is a real, factual difference between someone who 
has been fined $100 and someone in New York who objects to a policy 
of racial discrimination in California. One might think that in the for-
mer case there "just is" an injury, and that in the latter case there ·~ust 
isn't."123 The loss of money is a real and tangible harm; the offense 
produced by objectionable government policy may be intense, but it is 
merely offense. 
There are indeed factual differences between these cases, but it is 
not true that the first case involves a factual harm and the second does 
not. Both cases involve harm, as evidenced by the fact that people in 
both cases have been prompted to take the time, trouble, and expense 
to initiate proceedings. We might deny that someone objecting to gov-
ernment policy has suffered harm, and even label him a bystander;124 
but, if we do this, we are importing our own, value-laden ideas about 
what things ought to count. We are not simply describing some fact 
about the world. 
If the claim remains obscure, the Havens Realty case125 may be 
helpful. One of the issues in that case was whether standing could be 
conferred on "testers" - people who do not intend to rent or 
121. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
122. But cf Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (treating this harm as "abstract"). 
123. Here, as elsewhere in the law, believing is seeing. As Einstein once said, "It is the theory 
which decides what we can observe." WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND: EN-
COUNTERS AND CoNVERSATIONS 63 (1971). 
124. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739-40. 
125. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); cf Fallon, supra note 15, at 47-
59 (discussing congressional power to grant standing). 
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purchase a home or apartment but who pose as renters or purchasers 
in order to collect information about unlawfully discriminatory racial 
steering. Without any statute, testers could not possibly have stand-
ing. It would not matter if they perceived an "injury in fact" when 
they were given false, discriminatorily motivated information about 
the housing market. But Congress declared it unlawful "[t]o represent 
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspec-
tion, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available" and 
created a cause of action to enforce this right. 126 The Havens Realty 
Court held that, in view of this statute, Congress had conferred a sort 
of legal interest on testers and provided that it could be legally re-
dressed. The injury to the "statutorily created right to truthful hous-
ing information" was sufficient for constitutional purposes.121 
It cannot be right to say that the plaintiff in Havens Realty suffered 
no injury in fact before Congress had acted, and that the civil rights 
statute somehow conjured up an injury ("in fact"!). Instead the rele-
vant statute created a legally cognizable harm where none had existed 
before. Despite the Havens Realty Court's bow in the direction of in-
jury in fact, 128 the case shows that the real question is what harms that 
people perceive as such ought to be judicially cognizable. The out-
come in the case had nothing to do with "injury in fact." It had every-
thing to do with the set of legal rights that Congress had conferred.129 
In these circumstances, whether there is a so-called nonjusticiable 
ideological interest, or instead a legally cognizable "actual injury," is a 
product oflegal conventions and nothing else. To people who are part 
of the legal culture, some harms obviously count as such, but only 
because those claims are so familiar. Their familiarity often stems 
from the fact that they were protected at common law. To the same 
people, some harms are not perceived as such, but only because they 
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(d), 3612(a) (1988). 
127. 455 U.S. at 374. 
128. See 455 U.S. at 374. 
129. Consider also the closely related case ofTrafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 
U.S. 205 (1972). There, two tenants of a large apartment complex in California complained 
about their landlord's racially discriminatory practices. They contended that these practices de-
prived them of "important benefits from interracial association." 409 U.S. at 210. The Court 
allowed standing under a statute explicitly granting the right to sue. In a concurring opinion, 
Justice White rightly said that, without the statute, he "would have great difficulty in conclud-
ing" that there was a case or controversy. 409 U.S. at 212. Without the statute, we would say 
that the plaintiffs had a merely ideological injury; perhaps we would not be able to see the harm 
they suffered as an injury at all. After the enactment of the statute, however, a unanimous Court 
concluded that standing could be found. Is it even plausible to think that there was no "injury in 
fact" before the statute, and thus that the California plaintiffs came to experience an injury ("in 
fact"!) the day that Congress passed a law in the District of Columbia? 
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are unfamiliar. Their unfamiliarity often stems from the fact that they 
are foreign to the common law. 
Whether an injury is cognizable, however, should not depend on 
its familiarity or its common law pedigree; this approach would repre-
sent a conspicuous reintroduction of Lochner-era notions of substan-
tive due process. Whether an injury is cognizable should depend on 
what the legislature has said, explicitly or implicitly, or on the defini-
tions of injury provided in the various relevant sources of positive law. 
The Court should abandon the metaphysics of injury in fact. It should 
return to the question whether a cause of action has been conferred on 
the plaintiff. 
c. On law and fact. If my point still remains unclear, we might 
think a bit about what it really means for someone to have a legal 
interest in a problem or dispute. If I am offended because Jones com-
mits a tort against Smith, I apparently have no such interest, and I 
have no standing to sue Jones. But if Smith is my spouse, or my em-
ployee, the law may well have given me a legal interest, and I may well 
have standing to sue. If the actions of the U.S. government result in 
destruction of the rainforest, I have no legal interest and no standing 
to sue the government, and there is no case or controversy under Arti-
cle III. But suppose that Congress grants American citizens standing 
to sue their government for acts destructive of the rainforest. If it does 
so, it has, in effect, granted every American both a beneficial interest in 
the rainforest and a legal right to protect that interest in court. A 
cause of action, of course, is a property interest. 130 
When Congress creates a cause of action enabling people to com-
plain against racial discrimination, consumer fraud, or destruction of 
environmental assets, it is really giving people a kind of property right 
in a certain state of affairs. 131 Invasion of that property right is the 
relevant injury. If some of these things seem to be "property" only 
ambiguously, we might recall a lesson from law school's first year: 
property is simply a bundle of sticks, and property rights can exist in a 
wide variety of tangible and intangible matters. Nothing in the Con-
stitution forbids Congress from creating property interests of these 
various kinds or from allowing people to vindicate those interests in 
court. 132 
130. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (noting 
that denial of right to bring suit can constitute a deprivation of property). 
131. I am grateful to Michael McConnell for help with the points in this paragraph, though 
he bears no responsibility for the use to which I have put them here. 
132. Compare Joseph Vining's eloquent meditation on standing, written in the heyday of the 
apparent rejection of the legal interest test. See JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). Vin-
ing contends that American law had witnessed an abandonment of property-based thinking to-
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The resistance to this general approach stems from the deep famili-
arity of the common law catalogue of legal rights; people, or more 
importantly judges pondering "injury in fact," tend to think of prop-
erty in terms of that particular catalogue. But the notion that the 
common law exhausts Congress' power, and that the Constitution for-
bids it from intruding on that catalogue or creating new legal rights, is 
(I repeat) simply a modem form of substantive due process. Indeed, 
the parallel with substantive due process is very precise. In the early 
twentieth century, the common law catalogue was similarly thought to 
be part of the state of nature, or of "how things are," and thus to 
operate as a barrier to legislative efforts to redefine property inter-
ests.133 The examples suggest that there are innumerable "injuries in 
fact" produced by public and private action. Many of those injuries 
might well produce lawsuits. But an injury can become judicially cog-
nizable if and only if it has received legal status from some source of 
law. To this extent, the Data Processing Court's attempted shift from 
law to fact was doomed to fail from the beginning. 
I conclude with an analogy. For many decades, a conflict of laws 
between two jurisdictions would be resolved by seeing where the right 
had "vested."134 If the right had vested in state A, that state's law 
would apply; if it had vested in state B, the parties would be governed 
by the law of state B. Courts approached the question where has the 
right vested? as if it were a simple issue of fact. But eventually it be-
came clear that this was no factual inquiry, but instead a policy judg-
ment, to be answered by reference to the law of the relevant states and, 
where these did not speak, to the best possible judicial inferences on 
the matter.135 
The same should be true of the law of standing. In the long run, 
the injury-in-fact test will, I believe, be seen as the contemporary ana-
logue of the discredited notion of "vested rights" in the law of 
conflicts. 
3. The Congressionally Created Citizen Suit 
So much for conceptual matters. A final development is relevant 
to the period under discussion. Spurred by judicial developments and 
ward a new emphasis on the definition and implementation of public values. See id. at 23-27. If 
what I am suggesting is right, however, abandoning the touchstone of property is not so easy. 
Standing depends on some legal interest, however much we might try to redirect the inquiry, and 
if it depends on legal interest, it depends on something like property. 
133. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
134. See Alabama Great So. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (applying the "place 
of the wrong" rule). 
135. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990). 
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suspicion of agency "capture," Congress created a wide range of citi-
zens' suits. 136 These suits would be available against (a) private de-
fendants operating in violation of statute and (b) administrators failing 
to enforce the law as Congress required. Congress was especially en-
thusiastic about such suits in the environmental area, addressing the 
fear that statutory commitments would be threatened by bureaucratic 
failure. With a number of devices, including the citizen suit, Congress 
hoped to overcome administrative laxity and unenthusiasm, and also 
to counteract the relatively weak political influence of beneficiaries.137 
Congress did not, however, devote much attention to the constitution-
ality of citizen standing, and the issue was to remain open for many 
years. 
E. Redressability, Causation, and the Separation of Powers 
The fifth stage of standing law is the contemporary one. I begin 
with description and then tum to some apparent motivating 
assumptions. 
1. New Departures 
This period is defined principally by a series of cases establishing 
that the plaintiff does not suffer injury in fact unless he can show that 
(a) the injury is attributable to the conduct of the defendant and (b) 
the injury is likely to be redressed by a decree on his behalf. A less 
obvious but equally important development is the Court's tacit insis-
tence that the requisite injury in fact be defined in common law-like 
terms. A still less obvious development is the renewed use of Article 
II in standing cases; indeed, it may not be unfair to say that Article II 
concerns are coming to dominate the interpretation of Article III. As 
I will suggest, the Lujan opinion is motivated by many of the concerns 
expressed in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson, 138 
the independent counsel case. 
136. See supra note 11. 
137. In my view, this is an inadequate diagnosis of the basic problem of bureaucratic failure. 
A large part of that problem is command and control regulation and inadequate congressional 
attention to the problem of incentives imposed on administrative agencies and industries alike. 
The question is therefore not whether we should have "more" as opposed to "less" enforcement, 
but instead bow to create incentives for the right level of enforcement. Command and control 
regulation accompanied by the citizen suit is hardly an ideal solution. See R. Shep Melnick, 
Pollution Deadlines and the Coalition for Failure, in ENVIRONMENTAL PoLmcs 89 (Michael S. 
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., 1992); infra text accompanying note 265-69. For a more gen-
eral diagnosis, see Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REv. 949 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 
(1990). 
138. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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Notably, most of the key cases have involved attempts by some 
plaintiff to require the executive branch to fulfill its statutory responsi-
bilities by enforcing the law more vigorously. The initial step was 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 139 in which a mother of an illegitimate child 
brought suit against the local prosecutor, contending that his failure to 
initiate child support proceedings against the child's father caused her 
harm. The Court denied standing on the ground that it was unclear 
whether a decree in the plaintiff's favor would remedy that harm. The 
father might simply go to jail, leaving the mother no better off than 
before. According to the Court, this possibility rendered purely "spec-
ulative" whether prosecutorial proceedings would yield the desired 
outcome.140 
The Linda R.S. decision was followed by Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization. 141 There, the Court denied stand-
ing to indigent people protesting a change in tax policy which reduced 
the obligation of hospitals to provide medical services to the indigent. 
The plaintiffs claimed that they had sought and been denied medical 
treatment as a result of this ruling. According to the Court, the plain-
tiffs could not show that the changed policy actually affected their own 
situation. "It is purely speculative whether the denials of service ... 
fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result 
from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax 
implications. "142 
The third key case was Allen v. Wright. 143 In that case, the Court 
said that parents of black children attending public schools that were 
undergoing desegregation lacked standing to challenge the grant of tax 
deductions to segregated private schools. The pivotal point was that 
the plaintiffs could not show that a decree in their favor would actu-
ally affect their children. Denial of the tax deduction would not neces-
sarily benefit the plaintiffs. Any causal relationship between the 
deduction and the progress of any particular desegregation plan was, 
again, fatally "speculative."144 
An especially important section of the Allen opinion referred to 
Article II and to the separation of powers. The Court explained that, 
if the plaintiffs were to have standing, judges would become "virtually 
139. 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
140. 410 U.S. at 618. 
141. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
142. 426 U.S. at 42-43. 
143. 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 
U.S. 59 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
144. 468 U.S. at 758. 
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continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive ac-
tion. "145 The Court also suggested that standing here would risk judi-
cial usurpation of the President's power to "take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed."146 Standing should thus be unavailable "in a 
case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation 
works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus es-
tablished by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties."147 These 
suggestions - with Article II concerns prominently appearing in an 
Article III setting - have proved extremely important. 
2. General Trends in Administrative Law 
The cases in this fifth period of standing law reveal a more general 
trend in administrative law, a trend of which Lujan is very much a 
part. The fourth stage had witnessed a fundamental assault on the 
distinction between regulated objects and regulatory beneficiaries. In 
the past fifteen years, however, the Supreme Court has unmistakably if 
usually implicitly insisted on that very distinction. 
Professor Antonin Scalia of the University of Chicago Law School 
made his enthusiasm for the object-beneficiary distinction clear in an 
influential 1978 article on the Vermont Yankee case.148 In one of the 
first statements of this position, Scalia wrote that aggressive judicial 
review of administrative action would be most understandable when 
regulated industries were at risk and least understandable when regu-
latory beneficiaries sought greater regulation. 149 The Vermont Yankee 
case itself had nothing to do with standing. But there the Court ex-
pressed firm disapproval of active judicial policing of administrative 
policies, and perhaps it was not a coincidence that the case involved a 
suit by regulatory beneficiaries who wanted to bring about more strin-
gent regulatory controls on nuclear power.150 
A key .case, highly representative of current tendencies, is Heckler 
v. Chaney. 151 There the Court held that agency inaction, unlike 
agency action, would be presumed immune from judicial review. In so 
145. 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). 
146. 468 U.S. at 761 (quoting U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3). 
147. 468 U.S. at 761. 
148. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 SUP. Cr. REv. 345; see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 518 (1978). · 
149. See Scalia, supra note 148, at 388-89. 
150. For a powerful defense of Vermont Yankee's treatment of the substantive issue, see 
Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978). 
151. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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holding, the Court apparently drew a distinction between regulated 
objects and regulatory beneficiaries. Indeed, the Court defended its 
conclusion in part by suggesting that, when an agency fails to act, it 
"does not exercise its coercive power . . . and thus does not infringe 
upon areas that courts are often called upon to protect."152 Appar-
ently, only the interests of the objects generally are protected. The 
Chaney Court also referred to the Take Care Clause of Article II, sug-
gesting that this provided a further reason for judicial reluctance to 
supervise administrative inaction. In this way, Heckler v. Chaney is of 
a piece with Allen v. Wright and Lujan. In many other cases, the 
Court has rejected challenges to administrative decisions by regulatory 
beneficiaries.153 
As noted, most of the key standing cases involved efforts by regula-
tory beneficiaries to require enforcement of regulatory statutes. Before 
Lujan, the law thus stood poised for an explicit judicial distinction 
between suits by objects and suits by beneficiaries. 
3. ''Beneficiaries" Versus "Objects" 
What underlies the current trend? There are several possibilities, 
and all of them have probably contributed to a growing enthusiasm for 
the apparently discredited distinction between regulatory beneficiaries 
and regulated objects. The possibilities should be seen as a modem 
theoretical rejoinder to the 1960s and 1970s fear of agency capture by 
regulated objects. 
Some observers, for example, think that government regulation of 
private ordering is constitutionally suspect.154 The academic enthusi-
asm for greater constitutional checks on the regulatory state has ap-
parently found modest judicial support.155 Whether or not 
government regulation is unconstitutional, many people think that it is 
morally problematic, and perhaps this view too has support on the 
Supreme Court.156 Other people think that government regulation 
does not work in practice - that it produces high social costs for du-
152. 470 U.S. at 832. 
153. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Baltimore 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
154. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985). 
155. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (finding that envi-
ronmental regulation was a talcing). 
156. Something of this kind may be implicit in Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.) (agency's argument for 
stricter regulatory standards would "justify pervasive regulation limited only by the constraint of 
feasibility ..• [and] would give [the agency] power to impose enormous costs that might produce 
little, if any, discernible benefit"). 
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bious benefits.157 This view has influenced the executive branch, and it 
has appeared to play a role in the courts as well.158 Many people think 
that administrators are systematically inclined toward overenforce-
ment of regulatory statutes, or toward "capture" by regulatory benefi-
ciaries.159 Quite apart from issues of substance, some urge that 
judicial compulsion of regulatory action is unconstitutional on Article 
II grounds or at least constitutionally troublesome.160 Others think 
that courts cannot possibly play a fruitful role in assuring adequate 
implementation of regulatory statutes.161 Some or all of these ideas 
undoubtedly help explain what has become an unmistakable trend in 
favor of greater judicial insistence on the distinction between suits by 
regulating beneficiaries and suits by regulated objects.162 
II. LUJAN: DESCRIPTION AND APPRAISAL 
In this Part, I turn to Lujan. 163 I first discuss what the Court said 
and then evaluate its reasoning. Two detours will be necessary: first, 
to address Justice Scalia's conception of standing; and second, to deal 
with the role of the citizen suit in environmental and regulatory pol-
icy. I conclude with a brief suggestion about how Lujan should have 
been written. 
A. What the Court Said 
The Lujan case arose under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(ESA). 164 The ESA is an aggressive set of protections for endangered 
species. 165 Its key provision says that "Each Federal agency shall, in 
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Inte-
rior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such 
agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species .... "166 
157. See, e.g., CHICAGO STUDIES IN PoLmCAL EcONOMY (George J. Stigler ed., 1988). 
158. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); Exec. Order No. 
12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,316 (1985). 
159. See, e.g., NISKANEN, supra note 101, at 210-11. 
160. See JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL CoMPUISIONS (1989). 
161. See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE CoURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN 
AIR Acr (1983). 
162. I will not respond to all of these claims here; I believe that, at best, they capture some 
partial truths. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE (1990). 
163. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). 
164. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988)). 
165. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), is the celebrated illustration confirming this point. 
166. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). 
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For many years it has been uncertain whether the obligations of 
the ESA apply to actions of the U.S. government that are taken in 
foreign countries. In 1978, the relevant authorities agreed that the 
ESA did indeed apply outside the United States.167 But in 1983, the 
Interior Department initiated a change in its position. An important 
new regulation, ultimately issued in 1986, announced that the ESA 
would apply only to actions within the United States or on the high 
seas.16s 
The regulation had a number of important consequences. Ameri-
can agencies funding foreign projects were no longer required to con-
sult with the Secretary of the Interior if their projects would 
jeopardize the existence of endangered species. The ESA would pro-
vide no obstacle to the expenditure of American taxpayer dollars to 
projects that would threaten to eliminate endangered species outside 
U.S. borders. 
Environmental organizations, including Defenders of Wildlife, 
brought suit, claiming that the new regulation violated the statute. To 
establish standing, two members of Defenders of Wildlife claimed that 
they suffered an injury in fact. Joyce Kelly swore in an affidavit that 
she had traveled to Egypt in 1986 and viewed the habitat of the endan-
gered Nile crocodile. She claimed that she "intended to do so again, 
and hoped to observe the crocodile directly." Amy Skilbred claimed 
that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and observed the habitat of 
"endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the leopard." She 
also claimed that she intended to return to Sri Lanka to see members 
of these species. In a deposition, she acknowledged that she did not 
have a certain date for retum.169 
The Court's opinion, devoted entirely to the issue of standing, is 
quite straightforward. It falls into four parts: a general statement 
about standing; a discussion of injury in fact; an assessment of redres-
sability; and a treatment of the citizen suit. 
The general statement begins with a description of the function of 
standing in a system of separation of powers. According to the Court, 
Article III requires an "irreducible constitutional minimum of stand-
ing," with three elements: (1) an injury in fact that is both (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent rather than conjectural 
or hypothetical; (2) a demonstration that the injury is fairly traceable 
to the acts of the defendant, rather than of some third party; and (3) a 
167. See 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978). 
168. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,990 (1983) (proposing this result); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1991) (codifying 
final regulation). 
169. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 21.38. 
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showing that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a decision 
favorable to the plaintiff.17° 
This opening statement breaks little new ground. But the Court 
added that the standing issue will often be affected by "whether the 
plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at is-
sue."171 If the plaintiff is an object, the three requirements will ordina-
rily be met. But when an "injury arises from the government's 
allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, 
much more is needed."172 In such cases, there is the problem that 
"causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the 
regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inac-
tion - and perhaps on the response of others as well."173 The Court 
suggested that in such cases standing "is ordinarily 'substantially more 
difficult' to establish."174 The Court had implicitly drawn this distinc-
tion in Allen v. Wright, 175 but Lujan was the first case explicitly to 
mark out the categories. 
So much for the preliminaries. The Court's first specific holding 
was that an injury in fact had not been established. The intention to 
visit the places harboring endangered species was not enough. The 
plaintiffs had set out no particular plans. They specified no time when 
their indefinite plans would materialize. Thus they had shown no "ac-
tual or imminent" injury. 176 Nor could plaintiffs show injuries in fact 
by demonstrating a nexus linking the affected habitats with all the 
world's ecosystems, or linking their own "professional" interests in ob-
serving endangered species with the interests of all persons so en-
gaged.177 The fact that ecosystems are generally interrelated was not 
enough, because the plaintiffs could not show that they used portions 
of an ecosystem "perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in ques-
tion."178 Standing was similarly not available to anyone having an in-
terest in studying or seeing endangered species, because of a 
professional commitment or otherwise. There must be "a factual 
showing of perceptible harm."179 This, then, was the Court's reason-
170. 112 S. Ct. at 2136. 
171. 112 S. Ct. at 2137. 
172. 112 S. Ct. at 2137. 
173. 112 S. Ct. at 2137. 
174. 112 S. Ct. at 2137. 
175. 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text. 
176. 112 S. Ct. at 2138. 
177. 112 S. Ct. at 2139. 
178. 112 S: Ct. at 2139. 
179. 112 S. Ct. at 2139. The plurality did not foreclose the "nexus" approach to injury in 
fact. Justice Kennedy's concurrence preserved the possibility that similar "nexus" theories 
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ing on injury in fact. 
The second conclusion in Justice Scalia's opinion, accepted by only 
a plurality of the Court, was that the plaintiffs could not show redres-
sability. According to the plurality, the difficulty lay in the fact that 
the plaintiffs were challenging a general regulation not requiring con-
sultation with the Secretary of the Interior for funding actions outside 
of the United States. There were two problems, suggesting that the 
plaintiffs might not benefit from a decree in their favor. 
First, suppose that the district court awarded relief against the Sec-
retary; suppose that it required the Secretary to issue a regulation 
mandating consultation with him for foreign projects threatening an 
endangered species. It would remain unclear that the funding agencies 
would be bound by this regulation. They might simply ignore it; they 
might not consult at all. For this reason, there would be no clear ben-
efits to the plaintiffs from a favorable ruling. 
Second, the American agencies provide only part of the funding for 
the relevant foreign projects. Most of the money comes from else-
where. "AID, for example, has provided less than 10% of the fund-
ing" for one of the projects at issue in the case.180 Justice Scalia found 
it unclear whether the elimination of that partial fraction would affect 
the projects or the species in question. "[I]t is entirely conjectural 
whether the nonagency activity that affects respondents will be altered 
or affected by the agency action they seek to achieve."ts1 The plain-
tiffs could not show redressability, because a decree on their behalf 
might not yield their desired result. 
The Court's third conclusion was its most important. The court of 
appeals had relied on the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, permitting 
"any person [to] commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin 
any person, including the United States and any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any 
provision of this chapter."182 In a discussion with large consequences, 
the Court held in effect that this provision was unconstitutional as 
applied. 
The Court emphasized that Article III requires something more 
than "a generally available grievance about government - claiming 
only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of 
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and 
might serve to establish injuries in fact in other cases. See 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); infra text accompanying note 189. 
180. 112 S. Ct. at 2142. 
181. 112 S. Ct. at 2142. 
182. 16 u.s.c. § 1540(g)(l) (1988). 
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tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large."183 To support 
this contention, the Court cited cases from the 1920s and 1930s re-
jecting suits by citizens complaining about government action on con-
stitutional grounds. It also pointed to a number of post-1970 cases 
appearing to suggest that Article III in fact required a particularized 
injury.184 
The Court acknowledged that in none of these cases had Congress 
explicitly granted citizens a right to bring suit. But in the Court's 
view, this difference did not matter. The Court emphasized that 
"[v]indicating the public interest (including the public interest in gov-
ernment observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of 
Congress and the Chief Executive."185 In particular, the Court said 
that if Congress could tum "the undifferentiated public interest in ex-
ecutive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vin-
dicable in the courts,"186 it would be transferring "from the President 
to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional 
duty," that is, "to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' " 187 
Thus, the Court's decision rested on the fear that, if Congress could 
grant standing here, it would tum the judges into overseers, and 
usurpers, of the President himself. Here Article II helped give context 
to Article III. 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, offered an intriguing 
and somewhat ambiguous concurring opinion. He emphasized that, 
had the plaintiffs purchased an airplane ticket, set a specific date to 
visit the habitat of the endangered species mentioned, or used the rele-
vant sites on a regular basis, they might have established standing in a 
case of this kind.188 Indeed, Justice Kennedy was not willing to fore-
close the possibility that standing might be allowed on the basis of 
some "nexus" theory.189 He indicated that courts "must be sensitive 
to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear ana-
logs in our common-law tradition."190 Thus "Congress has the power 
to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise 
to a case or controversy where none existed before."191 But in this 
183. 112 S. Ct. at 2143. 
184. 112 S. Ct. at 2144. 
185. 112 S. Ct. at 2145. 
186. 112 S. Ct. at 2145. 
187. 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3). 
188. 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
189. 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
190. 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
191. 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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case Congress refused to "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and 
relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."192 In 
any case, Article III does not permit Congress to allow courts "to 
vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administra-
tion of the laws. While it does not matter how many persons have 
been injured by the challenged action, the party bringing suit must 
show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way."193 
B. Evaluation 
Each conclusion in the principal opinion is of considerable interest. 
I take them up in sequence. 
1. Injury 
The Court's conclusion on the matter of injury raises three differ-
ent issues. The first is whether the plaintiffs did indeed show an in-
jury, assuming the Court's definition of what the injury was. The 
second is whether the plaintiffs could have been permitted to 
recharacterize their injury in a different way. The third has to do with 
the general problems in the very notion of injury in fact. 
If we accept the Court's definition of injury, its conclusion was 
perhaps an innovation, but not an entirely implausible one. Its chief 
importance lay in the insistence that the injury must be "imminent." 
It is true that none of the plaintiffs could prove that they would revisit 
the relevant sites. So long as injury in fact is required, perhaps this 
point is decisive. Perhaps the plaintiffs failed to show with sufficient 
192. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
193. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
There were two other separate opinions. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. 112 S. 
Ct. at 2147. He concluded that plaintiffs had standing because some of them had visited a critical 
habitat of an endangered species, shown a professional interest in preserving the species and its 
habitats, and intended to revisit them in the future. They did not need to show that the return 
visit was imminent. They would suffer the relevant injury, sufficient for Article III purposes, as 
soon as the species was destroyed. Justice Stevens also contested the matter of redressability. He 
would have presumed that, if the Court required funding agencies to consult with the Secretary, 
the agencies would abide by the Court's interpretation, and that consultation would yield tangi-
ble results. Justice Stevens concurred only because he concluded that, on the merits, the ESA did 
not apply overseas. 
Justice Blackmun dissented in an opinion joined by Justice O'Connor. 112 S. Ct. at 2151. 
Justice Blackmun emphasized that Kelly and Skilbred swore that they would soon return to 
relevant project sites. In his view, a reasonable finder of fact could find that this was likely, thus 
confirming plaintiffs' injury in fact. The distant location of the Asian elephant was irrelevant to 
the fact that its destruction would impose a professional injury on the plaintiffs. Moreover, 
plaintiffs met the redressability requirement, for a threatened withdrawal of American funding 
might well affect foreign government conduct. If American funds were withdrawn, the possibil-
ity that the project might be scaled back or eliminated was sufficient to establish redressability. 
112 S. Ct. at 2156-57. 
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certainty that they would be affected by the government decisions at 
issue in the case. 
An argument to the contrary would suggest that one of the original 
purposes of the injury-in-fact test, made explicit in Data Processing, 194 
was to ensure that standing could be a simple, threshold determina-
tion, without an elaborate process of assessing the pleadings. In any 
case, it would be strange and unfortunate if jurisdictional issues turned 
out to rest on complex factual inquiries. In this light, it might seem to 
make little sense to require plaintiffs to purchase an airline ticket. Per-
haps this is unnecessary formalism. But the Court's point is at least 
one on which reasonable people can differ. If we put the congressional 
creation of citizen suits to one side, and if the outcome in Lujan turns 
on the fact that plaintiffs made an inadequate showing that they would 
indeed return to the relevant sites, the Court's decision is hardly 
implausible. 
A trickier issue, not dealt with in any of the opinions, involves the 
appropriate characterization of the injury. To understand the point, 
we need to look at a famous case that is seemingly far afield. Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke 195 presented an often-over-
looked problem of standing. Bakke himself could not show that with-
out the affirmative action program he challenged, he would have been 
admitted to the medical school of the University of California at Da-
vis. It was therefore argued that he could not meet the Article III 
requirement of injury in fact. 
The Court responded in a way that has potentially major 
implications: 
[E]ven if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been ad-
mitted in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he 
lacked standing .... The trial court found such an injury, apart from 
failure to be admitted, in the University's decision not to permit Bakke 
to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race. 196 
What happened here was that the Bakke Court found injury, cau-
sation, and redressability by the simple doctrinal device of recharacter-
izing the injury. In Bakke, the Court described the injury as involving 
not admission to medical school but the opportunity to compete on 
equal terms. The Court has not explicitly used this technique in any 
other case, 197 but it might easily have done so. In Simon v. Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization [EKWROJ, for example, the 
194. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-54 (1970). 
195. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
196. 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14. 
197. But see the housing discrimination cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 125-
29. The idea that there was redressability there, in the ordinary sense, is odd. See Logan, supra 
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Court might have said that the injury consisted not of a refusal of 
admission to a hospital, but instead of a decision not to permit the 
plaintiffs to have an opportunity to be admitted on the terms specified 
by law, simply because of unlawful incentives created by the IRS. 198 
In this way, Bakke and EKWRO were structurally similar. Likewise, 
in Allen v. Wright, 199 the Court might have recharacterized the injury 
as an opportunity not to have the desegregation process distorted by 
the incentives created through the grant of unlawful tax deductions to 
private schools. 
Suppose that, in Lujan itself, the plaintiffs had claimed that their 
injury consisted not of an inability to see certain species but of a di-
minished opportunity to do so. This diminished opportunity allegedly 
resulted from unlawful government action. On this view, the ESA was 
designed to ensure not that no species would become extinct - that 
was not an adequate description of the injury at issue - but more 
precisely that endangered species would not be subject to increased 
threats of extinction because of federal governmental action. The in-
jury of which the plaintiffs complained was the harm to their profes-
sional and tourist opportunities created by those increased risks. 
On this view, the injury in Lujan would therefore run parallel to 
that created by violations of the Equal Protection Clause, which is 
designed not to ensure that certain people get into medical school, but 
instead that they are not subject to increased risks of exclusion because 
of racial factors. Structurally, a plausible conception of the harm in 
Lujan would accord with that in Bakke - a harm to an opportunity, 
here the opportunity to observe certain species. 
If Bakke is right on the standing question, it is not so easy to ex-
plain why the same approach would have been wrong in Lujan. If 
there is a difference between the relevant injuries, it may stem from the 
fact that the Equal Protection Clause conspicuously protects the right 
to compete on an equal basis; this is not a contestable interpretation 
(however much we may dispute what "equal" means). The clause 
does not confer the right to a certain set of favorable outcomes. The 
ESA is far more ambiguous on this score. Perhaps the injury against 
which it guards is the actual loss of an endangered species because of 
U.S. government action, rather than the diminished opportunity to 
view such a species in its natural habitat. 
But this interpretation is far from clear. Why could we not view 
note 15, at 77-81. The Court did not require ordinary redressability because there was a clear 
invasion of a statutory right and a clear congressional grant of standing. See id. 
198. 426 U.S. 26 (1976); see supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing case). 
199. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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the ESA as protecting the right to have the opportunity to see endan-
gered species unaffected by adverse action by government agencies? 
Surely Congress has the constitutional power to create such a right. 
But courts may wish to avoid this interpretation in the absence of an 
especially clear congressional statement. The recharacterization of in-
juries to include less particularized, "opportunity" harms does expand 
the category of people entitled to bring suit. At some point the 
recharacterization will mean that all, or almost all, citizens are 
harmed in the same way. Prudential considerations might well coun-
sel against this step. 200 
This point suggests that, when Congress has not spoken clearly, 
courts should not allow injuries to be characterized in such broad 
terms that the plaintiff is not particularly affected. But in Lujan, there 
was no such problem. The plaintiffs had a fully plausible professional 
and educational interest in the species at issue. If the plaintiffs had 
tried to characterize their injury as the diminished opportunity to pro-
mote their interests, they should have been permitted to do so. There 
is little law on this issue, but perhaps inventive plaintiffs will be per-
mitted to make efforts in this direction in the future. 
I conclude that, as the case was litigated, the Court's conclusion on 
injury in fact was probably incorrect, but plausible, and in any case no 
great innovation. Because of the way the case was litigated, there was 
no occasion to think hard about the appropriate characterization of 
the injury. Thus the implications of Bakke remain unclear. 
The third problem involves the notion of injury in fact. I have 
suggested that whether there is such an injury turns not merely on 
facts but also on whether the law has recognized certain harms as legal 
ones.201 This principle means, for example, that a person in New 
York has no standing to challenge racial discrimination in Iowa, as no 
law treats distant discrimination as an injury. The same result would 
occur with a Lujan-style action brought before enactment of the ESA. 
But now suppose _that Congress has given to all Americans a kind of 
beneficial legal interest in the survival of the Nile crocodile, at least in 
the sense that it has granted each of us a jointly held property right, 
operating against acts of the U.S. government that threaten to destroy 
the species. Suppose too that Congress has granted every American 
the right to sue to vindicate that property right. What in the Constitu-
tion forbids this action? Surely not the Due Process Clause; surely not 
Article II; and surely not Article III. 
200. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 278-79 (arguing that broadened congressional grants of 
standing may undercut rights of those most directly affected). 
201. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text. 
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I suggest that this is very much what happened in the ESA itself. 
By creating citizen standing, Congress in essence created the relevant 
property interest and allowed citizens to vindicate it. To this extent, 
Congress did indeed create the requisite injury in fact, and the Court 
should have recognized it as such. If a problem remains, perhaps it 
lies in Congress' failure to be explicit on the point. This may ulti-
mately be the meaning of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, and if 
so it remains possible for Congress to solve the problem through more 
careful drafting. I discuss these points in Part III. 202 
2. Redressability 
On the question of redressability, there was no majority for the 
Court. Three justices saw no problem with redressability; two Justices 
refused to speak to the issue; four Justices found a constitutional de-
fect. Because no majority spoke, the Lujan case has little precedential 
value on this question. 
To evaluate the issue of redressability in the recent cases, it is im-
portant to understand why courts require redressability at all. The 
basic reason is akin to that underlying the prohibition on advisory 
opinions. Let us suppose that an injury in fact is required. If a decree 
in the plaintiff's favor will not remedy that injury, is not such a decree 
an advisory opinion, at least with respect to the plaintiff? If the harm 
to the plaintiff will persist after the decree, why should the court be-
come involved at all? For this reason, the redressability requirement 
seems to be a reasonable inference from the requirement of injury in 
fact. In the abstract, it makes perfect sense. 
The difficulty arises in cases in which Congress has attempted to 
restructure administrative and private incentives so as to bring about 
structural or systemic change, but in a way that will not necessarily 
yield the particular outcomes sought in particular cases. Assume, for 
example, that Congress expressly forbids the grant of federal funds to 
international projects that threaten endangered species. If the agency 
withholds the funds, no particular project will necessarily be stopped, 
nor will any particular species necessarily be saved. The project may 
go forward without American participation, or the species may not 
survive even without the project. Or suppose that Congress forbids 
universities receiving federal funds from discriminating on the basis of 
race. If the funds are withheld, discrimination may continue. No pre-
diction on this score can avoid being "speculative." 
In cases of this kind, the relevant harm consists of a grant of funds 
202. See infra text accompanying notes 295-310. 
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that makes certain harms more likely as a result of the contribution of 
American tax dollars - the loss of a species or the incidence of dis-
crimination. The examples illustrate what Congress frequently at-
tempts to do in the areas of funding requirements, environmental 
protection, and risk regulation in general: it attempts to change incen-
tives in a way that should produce aggregate changes without neces-
sarily affecting outcomes in particular cases. The reduction of sulfur 
dioxide emission levels in California will reduce the risk that people 
will suffer from respiratory disease. But it will usually be speculative 
in any particular case whether the mandated reduction will make any 
difference to a particular human life. 
In such cases, whether an injury is redressable depends on how it is 
characterized. If the injury is described in sharply particularistic, com-
mon law-like terms, it will not be redressable, since the consequences 
of victory for any particular plaintiff cannot be ascertained in advance. 
But if it is characterized as an increased risk of harm - if that is the 
relevant injury - it will certainly be redressed by a decree in the plain-
tiff's favor. A decision to require compliance with national ambient 
air quality standards will make the air cleaner, and that will decrease 
the risk of harm to people in the relevant territory. Cases of this sort 
are a staple of modem administrative law. Much the same analysis 
might be applied to a decision to withdraw funds from schools that 
discriminate on the basis of race or sex. 
The point casts light on Justice Kennedy's suggestion that courts 
"must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do 
not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition."203 Indeed, in 
these sorts of cases it makes little sense to ask if a decree in the plain-
tiff's favor will remedy a common law-like injury. The question is: 
What is the harm that Congress sought to prevent? To answer this 
question, a court has to engage in statutory interpretation. In the end, 
the issue of redressability, like that of injury in fact, turns on what 
Congress has provided. Redressability might even be understood as a 
crude proxy for an inquiry into legislative instructions about who is 
entitled to bring suit. 
In Lujan, the harm Congress sought to prevent would indeed have 
been redressed by the decree. The alleged violation was a procedural 
one - that is, a failure to require consultation with the Secretary of 
the Interior on the fact that the project threatened an endangered spe-
cies. If we suppose that the injury-in-fact requirement is met, the 
redressability issue poses no further obstacle. If plaintiffs were injured 
203. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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by the failure to consult, then a decree ordering consultation would 
have redressed the harm. Of course, survival of the endangered spe-
cies is not a necessary consequence of the requirement to consult. Per-
haps the agencies would refuse to consult; perhaps removal of funding 
would not affect any species. But none of this is relevant. For pur-
poses of redressability, a requirement of consultation must merely af-
fect incentives in the statutorily required way. 
On this point, Lujan is self-contradictory, and the internal contra-
diction helps show why redressability should have presented no prob-
lem. The Court acknowledged (without any real explanation) that in 
some cases involving procedural violations, plaintiffs need not show 
redressability. The Court stated that "[t]his is not a case where plain-
tiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of 
which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs ... "204 and 
added in a crucial footnote: "The person who has been accorded a 
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right 
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy. "205 
As noted, the Court did not explain this conclusion; I try to do so 
below.206 But if plaintiffs need not meet the normal standards for 
redressability for procedural violations, it follows that plaintiffs in Lu-
jan itself need not have met the normal standards for redressability. 
Indeed, under this reasoning, redressability need not be shown in a 
wide range of cases in which a plaintiff contends that the executive 
branch has failed to comply with a procedural requirement imposed 
by law.201 
A contrary conclusion would produce surprising results. It would 
mean that Article III imposed a constitutional obstacle to most ordi-
nary administrative law cases. In the usual case, a litigant contends 
that an agency has failed to follow some procedural requirement - by 
holding inadequate hearings, failing to give notice, meeting with pri-
vate people, or attending to a statutorily irrelevant factor. In all such 
cases, it might well be said, under the apparent standard in Lujan, that 
the redressability requirement has not been met. In such cases, it is 
204. 112 S. Ct. at 2142. 
205. 112 S. Ct. at 2142 n.7. 
206. See infra text accompanying notes 280-81. 
207. Hence Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org. [EKWRO], 426 U.S. 26 (1976), are incorrect if they are understood as redressability cases. 
They may be right, but only because of likely congressional instructions. Congress does not 
ordinarily allow one taxpayer to litigate the tax liability of another. This well-established back-
ground principle is probably the concern to which these cases legitimately respond. See EK-
WRO, 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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entirely "speculative" whether a decree in the defendant's favor will 
remedy the alleged injury. Lujan cannot be understood to say that 
these conventional cases have all of a sudden become nonjusticiable. 
I will attempt to sort out these very complex issues below.208 For 
the moment, we should think of redressability as a crude device for 
determining whether Congress intended to confer a cause of action.209 
When Congress has not spoken, the absence of redressability - under-
standing the injury in relatively concrete, personalized terms - may 
argue for the conclusion that the national legislature has not conferred 
standing on the plaintiff. This idea may be part of the prudential no-
tion that standing will not be recognized for "generalized griev-
ances. "210 Certainly courts should not recognize standing when the 
injury, however characterized, will not be redressed by a decree in the 
plaintiff's favor. As an independent Article III requirement, however, 
the notion of redressability makes little sense in the cases under 
discussion. 
3. Citizen Suits 
By far the most important and novel holding in Lujan was that 
Congress cannot grant standing to citizens. The largest conclusion, 
also set out in Justice Scalia's 1983 Suffolk Law Review article, is that 
Article III requires a concrete, particularized, actual, or imminent in-
jury in fact that also satisfies the causation and redressability require-
ments. This conclusion rested on the Court's own precedents, on the 
Take Care Clause, and on a particular understanding of Article III.211 
I take these in order. 
a. Precedents. The Court relied on two sets of cases. The first, 
from the 1920s and 1930s, rejected on standing grounds some odd 
constitutional challenges to governmental decisions. In Fairchild v. 
Hughes, 212 the Court dismissed a suit that challenged the process be-
hind ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment; in Massachusetts v. 
Mellon,213 the Court did the same for a taxpayer suit challenging fed-
208. See infra text accompanying notes 280-82. 
209. See Fletcher, supra note 15. 
210. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). 
211. The Court did not address some of the staples of standing law: that injury in fact as-
sures "concrete adversariness"; that it guards against collusive suits; that it ensures that suits will 
not be hypothetical or remote. The Court was wise not to emphasize these points, since they 
have nothing to do with standing. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1448. 
212. 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 
213. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
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eral expenditures; in Ex parte Levitt, 214 the Court dismissed an action 
challenging Justice Hugo Black's appointment to the Supreme Court. 
None of these cases involved a congressional grant of standing. All 
involved constitutional claims. Following the discussion in Part I, I 
suggest that all of these cases are best understood as attempts to per-
suade the Court to create private rights of action under constitutional 
provisions, as in the 1971 case of Bivins v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents. 215 In Bivins, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amend-
ment implicitly creates a private right of action - that is, it implicitly 
authorizes people to bring suit for damages to vindicate their Fourth 
Amendment rights. 216 But not every constitutional provision creates a 
private right of action. It seems especially implausible to say that con-
stitutional provisions create such rights when the relevant duty runs to 
the public as a whole rather than to affected individuals. Under tradi-
tional standards, a law that creates a duty to the general public does 
not give rise to privately enforceable rights.2 11 
Fairchild, Mellon, and Ex parte Levitt should be seen as suits at-
tempting to create private rights of action under constitutional provi-
sions that did not contemplate such actions. This understanding 
accords with the language of the opinions, which indeed suggests that 
the relevant constitutional provisions do not create private rights. 
Hence the words in Fairchild: "Plaintiff has [asserted] only the right, 
possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be adminis-
tered according to law and that the public moneys not be wasted. Ob-
viously this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute 
in the federal courts a suit .... "218 
In thinking about these precedents, we may go a bit further. A 
well-established view holds that courts should be reluctant to invoke 
constitutional provisions as a check on democratic processes.219 Ex-
cept when absolutely necessary, constitutional adjudication should be 
214. 302 U.S. 633 (1937). 
215. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
216. 403 U.S. at 395. 
217. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted) ("First, is the plaintiff 
'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted' •.. ?"); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
218. 258 U.S. at 129-30. It follows that ifFiast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), is correct, it is 
because the Establishment Clause indeed provides a Bivins-type cause of action to restrain unlaw-
ful expenditures. Thus Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), directs attention 
to the right issue - the existence of a private right. 454 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting). I 
believe, however, that his favorable conclusion was incorrect in the particular case. 
219. The classic discussion is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 
(1962). 
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avoided. Many of the justiciability doctrines - standing, ripeness, 
mootness, political questions - can be understood as an effort to ex-
emplify the relevant "passive virtues."220 
Ideas of this sort were close to the heart of the jurisprudence of 
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, who were, as we have seen, the 
central figures behind the rise of standing limitations. However con-
troversial these ideas may be to some, 221 they are fully intelligible. But 
there is a huge difference between cases reflecting judicial reluctance to 
invoke the Constitution to challenge legislative outcomes and cases in 
which Congress, the national lawmaker, has explicitly created stand-
ing so as to ensure bureaucratic conformity with democratic will. 
In the latter sort of case, considerations of democracy support the 
grant of standing. The democratic process has produced citizen stand-
ing, which it perceived as necessary to promote compliance with the 
democratic will as reflected in the governing statute. The normal no-
tions of "passive virtues" have no role. Hence the cases from the 
1920s and 1930s seem irrelevant to the issue in Lujan. 
The second set of precedents relied on in Lujan consist of cases 
from the 1970s and 1980s, announcing the three Article III require-
ments. Some of these cases had the same form as the cases from the 
1920s and 1930s. They too involved efforts to persuade courts to cre-
ate private rights of action under constitutional provisions. 222 In the 
other cases, the Court was not dealing with an express congressional 
grant of standing. This is a crucial difference. If standing depends on 
positive law, decisions denying standing without an express grant are 
hardly authority for cases with an express grant. Indeed, in some of 
these cases the Court expressly suggested that such a grant could make 
a critical difference.223 
On the basis of all these considerations, it seems clear that the re-
sult in Lujan has no firm support in the precedents. The issue of citi-
zen standing had never been decided. 
b. Article II and the Take Care Clause. The Court's second argu-
ment is that standing limitations for citizens are necessary in order to 
protect against intrusions on the President's power under the Take 
Care Clause.224 This is an extremely important claim. It links Justice 
220. See id. at 111-98. 
221. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues'': A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964). 
222. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 464; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
223. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). 
224. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2145. 
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Scalia's Lujan opinion with his insistence elsewhere on a "unitary ex-
ecutive," one that is free from interference by others.225 We may spec-
ulate that, on Justice Scalia's view, the notion of a "unitary executive" 
equally forbids citizen suits that allow judicial intrusions on the "Take 
Care" power and statutory initiatives that remove executive power 
from the President in favor of independent counsels. But what is the 
precise relationship between standing limitations and the President's 
power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed? 
From its text and history, it seems clear that the Take Care Clause 
confers both a duty and a power226 and that it does indeed impose 
limits on what courts can do to the bureaucracy. The Take Care 
Clause confers a power insofar as it grants to the President, and no one 
else, the authority to oversee the execution of federal law.227 The pro-
vision therefore carries implications for the perennial question of the 
President's power over the administration. It also suggests that over-
sight of bureaucratic implementation falls to the President, not to 
Congress or the courts. 
But the Take Care Clause confers a duty insofar as it imposes on 
the President both a responsibility to be faithful to law and an obliga-
tion to enforce the law as it has been enacted, rather than as he would 
have wished it to be. It is for this reason that the standard administra-
tive law case raises no issue under the Take Care Clause. If an object 
of regulation establishes that an agency has enforced the law in an 
unlawful way, the President has violated his duty under the Take Care 
Clause. A judicial decree to this effect raises no problem under that 
clause; it merely enforces the constitutional obligation in the constitu-
tionally authorized way. 
This point is not limited to cases involving regulated objects. If a 
regulatory beneficiary with standing persuades a court that the Presi-
dent is violating the law, and the court so holds, there is no constitu-
tional difficulty. Imagine, for example, that the plaintiffs in Lujan had 
purchased their plane tickets and made plans to leave for the relevant 
countries on a certain date. The Lujan Court acknowledged that such 
circumstances would give rise to standing.228 If the plaintiffs pro-
225. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
226. See Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 V AND. L. 
REV. 389 (1987). 
227. I do not mean to take a position on the complex issues raised by presidential displace-
ment of administrative authority. For a discussion of these issues, see generally Peter L. Strauss, 
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 573 (1984). 
228. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2138. I put to one side the issue of redressability; it is irrelevant 
for present purposes. 
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ceeded to win on the merits, no problem would arise under the Take 
Care Clause. A judicial decision for the plaintiffs would signal that 
the President had violated his constitutional command to respect and 
enforce the ESA as enacted. 
We can thus conclude that the Take Care Clause poses no 
problems in suits by regulated objects, and also no problem in suits by 
regulatory beneficiaries, even if they are requiring the executive to en-
force certain laws against his will. All of this suggests that the rela-
tionship between standing limits and the Take Care Clause is at best 
ambiguous - and in the end, I believe, nonexistent. If a court could 
set aside executive action at the behest of plaintiffs with a plane ticket, 
why does the Take Care Clause forbid it from doing so at the behest of 
plaintiffs without a ticket? Why do courts become "virtually continu-
ing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action"229 if 
they hear claims of official illegality in the second class of cases? 
These questions do not establish that there are no limits on stand-
ing. But they do raise doubts about the relevance of the Take Care 
Clause. In fact they suggest that the clause, however relevant it may 
be to many issues on administrative law, is irrelevant to the question of 
standing. 
Lujan seems to be built in key part on the idea that citizen standing 
- like other legislative interference with the President's power to exe-
cute the law230 - is unacceptable under Article II. Indeed, many of 
the recent standing cases might be thought to be Article II cases mas-
querading under the guise of Article III; we may even say that the 
Article II tail is wagging the Article III dog. But the conflation of 
Article II and Article III concerns has led to serious confusion. If a 
plaintiff with a plane ticket can sue under the ESA without offense to 
Article II, then it makes no sense to say that Article II is violated if a 
plaintiff lacking such a ticket initiates a proceeding. Beneficiary stand-
ing poses no Article II issue. The two articles raise quite different 
concerns; they should be analyzed separately. 
The Court's answer, set out in a brief passage, appears to take the 
following form. It is one thing for judges to protect "individual 
rights." Courts can properly engage in this task, which is uniquely 
theirs. But it is another thing to protect "public rights that have been 
legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part 
of the public."231 In the end, however, this argument seems to have 
229. 112 S. Ct. at 2145. 
230. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
231. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2145. 
214 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:163 
little to do with the Take Care Clause. Instead, it must rest on the 
understanding that Article III places a substantive limitation on what 
sorts of harms can count as legally cognizable injuries. 
That leaves the question of the content of the limitation. If we 
supplement the cryptic passages in Justice Scalia's Lujan opinion with 
the fuller ones in Judge Scalia!sSuffolk Law Review essay, we can offer 
some speculation. Perhaps individual rights count as such only when 
they are minority rights - when they are not widely shared. I will 
return to this point below.232 For the moment let us explore the ques-
tion of substantive limits on congressional power to create causes of 
action. 
c. Article IIL In the end the best defense of Lujan must be that 
Article III allows federal courts to assume jurisdiction only when the 
plaintiff has a certain sort of interest. The core of the argument ap-
pears in Justice Scalia's 1983 article: Cases involving the requisite in-
terests comport with "an accurate description of the sort of business 
courts had traditionally entertained, and hence of the distinctive busi-
ness to which they were presumably to be limited under the Constitu-
tion."233 The statement is surprisingly casual. No historical argument 
is offered for the claim about the traditional "sort of business." More-
over, the word "presumably" takes the place of a complex historical 
argument. 
As a matter of history, we have seen that Scalia's claim is not 
sound; in fact, it is baseless. As discussed in Part I, courts had "tradi-
tionally entertained" a wide variety of suits instituted by strangers. 234 
Neither English nor American practice supports the view that stranger 
suits are constitutionally impermissible. There is no evidence that Ar-
ticle III was designed to forbid Congress from entertaining such suits. 
On the contrary, the practice of the early Congress - freely creating 
the qui tam and informers' action without a hint of constitutional 
doubt - suggests that there were no limits on congressional creation 
of standing. 
The absence of a firm basis for Lujan in constitutional text or his-
tory should probably be decisive against the Court's reasoning. If the 
text and history are compatible with what Congress has done in creat-
ing citizen suits, courts have no warrant to intervene. To reach this 
conclusion, it is not necessary to linger over Justice Scalia's more ab-
stract and speculative argument about the appropriate role of the 
232. See infra text accompanying notes 240-57. 
233. Scalia, supra note 1, at 882. 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 32-71. 
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courts in a democracy, an argument that stems from political theory. 
But because that argument is obviously influencing the development of 
standing principles in the Supreme Court and elsewhere, it is worth-
while to address the argument here. 
C. Detour L· Justice Scalia's Conception of Standing 
In his 1983 essay, Justice Scalia argued that "courts need to accord 
greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional re-
quirement that the plaintiff's alleged injury be a particularized one, 
which sets him apart from the citizenry at large."235 Scalia acknowl-
edged that this was "not a linguistically inevitable conclusion. " 236 The 
text of Article III does not suggest that a personal injury is necessary. 
But in his key statement, discussed above, Scalia defended the limita-
tion on grounds of tradition.231 
Scalia explicitly claimed that "there is a limit upon even the power 
of Congress to convert generalized benefits into legal rights - and 
that is the limitation imposed by the so-called 'core' requirement of 
standing."238 A central concern is what Scalia describes the recent 
rise of the courts as "equal partners" with the legislative and executive 
branches. In his view, this unfortunate development is related to the 
law of standing. Thus Scalia suggests that "[t]he sine qua non for 
emergence of the courts as an equal partner with the executive and 
legislative branches in the formulation of public policy was the assur-
ance of prompt access to the courts by those interested in conducting 
the debate."239 Unlimited standing gave people this prompt access, 
thus impairing the system of separation of powers in two ways: first, 
by providing more occasions for judicial review of executive action; 
second, by changing the timing of that review. 
The core of Scalia's argument, however, lies elsewhere. 
[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional un-
democratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against imposi-
tions of the majority, and excludes them from the even more 
undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should 
function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself. 240 
It is through this lens that Scalia offers the distinction with which I 
began this article. In the first class of cases, "an individual who is the 
235. Scalia, supra note 1, at 881-82. 
236. Id. at 882. 
237. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
238. Scalia, supra note l, at 886. 
239. Id. at 893. 
240. Id. at 894 (emphasis omitted). 
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very object of a law's requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it"; 
here, standing is simple. In the second class, "the plaintiff is com-
plaining of an agency's unlawful failure to impose a requirement or 
prohibition upon someone else"; here the harm is "a majoritarian 
one."241 
The central point in the analysis is that 
[u]nless the plaintiff can show some respect in which he is harmed more 
than the rest of us . . . he has not established any basis for concern that 
the majority is suppressing or ignoring the rights of a minority that 
wants protection, and thus has not established the prerequisite for judi-
cial intervention. 242 
Thus, the "doctrine of standing ... is an essential means of restricting 
the courts to their assigned role of protecting minority rather than 
majority interests."243 Scalia urged that judges had been assigned this 
role by the Constitution, and also that the other role - the protection 
of majority interests - would be poorly executed by judges. 
After all, judges are removed from political accountability and se-
lected from a highly educated elite. This situation 
is just perfect for a body that is supposed to protect the individual 
against the people; it is just terrible (unless you are a monarchist) for a 
group that is supposed to decide what is good for the people. Where the 
courts, in the supposed interest of all the people, do enforce upon the 
executive branch adherence to legislative policies that the political pro-
cess itself would not enforce, they are likely (despite the best of inten-
tions) to be enforcing the political prejudices of their own class.244 
Scalia was alert to the concern that, without broad standing for 
beneficiaries, legislative enactments would be unlawfully under-
enforced within the bureaucracy. Indeed, he noted that statutes might 
get "lost or misdirected" in the executive branch; furthermore, he ad-
mitted that this was indeed the consequence of his proposal. 245 But -
and this is the article's striking conclusion - this is "a good thing."246 
Executive nonimplementation of statutes is part of a well-functioning 
democratic process, keeping law current with existing views. "Yester-
day's herald is today's bore."247 
This is a provocative and arresting argument, made in short com-
pass. But it faces several difficulties. One problem is that the argu-
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 894-95. 
243. Id. at 895. 
244. Id. at 896. 
245. Id. at 897. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
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ment is strikingly ahistorical. The article does not address the 
question whether the Framers actually had this conception of Article 
III. As we have seen, there is no evidence that they did. There is 
considerable evidence to the contrary. 
A second problem is that the approach seems inconsistent with 
some of the most prominent aspects of Justice Scalia's own jurispru-
dence. Justice Scalia usually insists that judges should read constitu-
tional provisions at a low level of generality and avoid infusing them 
with broad "values" of their own. In his view, such impositions in-
crease the occasions for judicial invalidation of legislation. 248 In this 
case, however, Scalia reads Article III broadly, invests it with general, 
controversial values, and ultimately recommends judicial invalidation 
of the outcomes of democratic processes. The theory of "minority 
rights" is after all a controversial theory of democracy, counselling 
courts to act in some cases but not in others. Let us assume that the 
argument is plausible, as it indeed appears to be. Should even a plausi-
ble theory of this kind be invoked in order to invalidate a law that is 
not inconsistent with the text and history of the Constitution? 
There is a further problem. In a case of beneficiary or citizen 
standing, courts are not enforcing "executive branch adherence to leg-
islative policies that the political process itself would not enforce. "249 
Instead, they are requiring the executive branch to adhere to the law, 
that is, to outcomes that the political process has endorsed. In Lujan, 
for example, the plaintiffs would have won only if they could have 
shown an unambiguous legislative judgment in their favor.250 Stand-
ing would produce "legislative policies that the political process itself 
would not enforce"251 only if courts systematically misinterpreted stat-
utes. But this seems to be an unsupportable assumption. 
In addition, it is hardly a good thing if agency implementation 
defeats legislative judgments. Suppose, for example, that the EPA de-
cided that statutes calling for a form of cost-benefit balancing should 
be construed not to allow consideration of costs, and thus to require a 
kind of environmental absolutism. Would it be plausible to say that 
this is "a good thing," so long as the agency, supervised as it is by the 
President, had so concluded? Surely not. Agency rejection of con-
248. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884-85 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 112 
(1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.). 
249. Scalia, supra note 1, at 896. 
250. Cf. Chevron USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (noting that EPA regulations under 
Clean Air Act would not be set aside unless such regulations were contrary to the express intent 
of Congress or based on an unreasonable interpretation of the statute). 
251. Scalia, supra note 1, at 896. 
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gressional enactments, even if motivated by the President himself, is 
inconsistent with the system of separation of powers. 
There are of course important political constraints on administra-
tive behavior, and an understanding of those constraints is a valuable 
part of administrative law. 252 Moreover, the power of the executive to 
temper legislative enactments is indeed an important aspect of demo-
cratic government. The President can appropriately exercise this 
power in many areas, including prosecutorial discretion, interpretation 
of ambiguities, incremental policymaking, and not-so-incremental 
judgments when Congress has spoken ambiguously. But the executive 
is not normally empowered to violate the law through enforcement 
activity in violation of the boundaries set by Congress. Justice Scalia 
cannot be taken to argue in favor of the "updating" that occurs when 
the President implements a law in such a way as to rewrite it. 
To bring this problem closer to the standing issue, suppose that an 
agency decides that the BSA should not be applied to American activi-
ties in foreign nations, when in fact Congress plainly intended that the 
BSA should apply abroad. Is this a good thing? On the contrary, it is 
a violation of democratic aspirations and (more relevant still) of the 
system for national lawmaking set up by Articles I and II of the Con-
stitution. If agency enforcement beyond that intended by Congress is 
not "a good thing," even where the agency responds to political pres-
sures, it is not "a good thing" where an agency undertakes a pattern of 
enforcement that violates congressional will through abdication or 
failure to act. Asymmetry on this point would simply translate judi-
cial antipathy to regulation into administrative law. The foreclosure 
of standing cannot plausibly be defended as a means of allowing the 
bureaucracy to implement the law in a manner that conflicts with the 
governing statute. 
Let us turn, finally, to Justice Scalia's argument from democratic 
theory, referred to briefly in Lujan itself.253 That argument rests on a 
distinction between minority and majority interests. The distinction 
between regulatory objects and regulatory beneficiaries, for purposes 
of standing, is said to rest on this prior distinction, which is itself said 
to be well adapted to the special role of courts in the American legal 
system. "Objects" represent a minority whose interests require judi-
cial protection; "beneficiaries" represent a majority who can protect 
their concerns through the political process. But there are two 
problems with this argument. The first is that it does not justify a 
252. See R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMJN. L. REV. 
245 (1992). 
253. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2145. 
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distinction between the objects and beneficiaries of regulation. The 
second is that it turns on an inadequate conception of the workings of 
American democracy. 
Suppose we agreed that courts should not protect majority inter-
ests through administrative law. The result would be to jeopardize 
standing for many objects of regulation, not merely for beneficiaries. 
Often the objects of regulation are indeed majority interests. A regula-
tion might, for example, affect a large number of companies at once, 
and in the process impose costs principally on consumers, which is to 
say on nearly all of us. Majorities are affected even when "objects" are 
at risk. But objects are not therefore to be deprived of standing, at 
least not without wreaking havoc on traditional administrative law. 
Indeed, the objects of regulation are not systematically more likely to 
be "majorities" than the beneficiaries. If we were to build our theory 
of standing on majority status, we must rethink standing in important 
ways - but not in the ways recommended by Justice Scalia. The ma-
jority-minority distinction is too crude a basis for distinguishing bene-
ficiaries from objects. 
Now let us turn to the workings of American democracy. Justice 
Scalia's argument seems to be that courts are well-suited to protecting 
minorities, which cannot protect themselves through the democratic 
process, whereas they are in poor position to protect majorities, whose 
natural forum is the democratic process. The politically responsive 
institution is in turn the executive branch. 
But this argument is too simple. Some minorities are especially 
well-organized and do indeed have access to the political process, in-
cluding the executive branch. The point is well documented.254 At 
least sometimes, regulated industries are a prominent example. But 
they are not therefore to be deprived of standing. 
Moreover, some majorities are so diffuse and ill-organized that 
they face systematic transaction costs barriers to the exercise of ongo-
ing political influence. This point is well documented in the area of 
environmental protection and elsewhere.255 The citizen suit is 
designed as a corrective.256 Essentially, this cause of action reflects the 
congressional judgment that some interests, including those of majori-
ties, are so diffuse and unorganized that they require judicial protec-
tion in the implementation process. Congress' judgment to this effect 
254. See supra note 99. 
255. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
256. See generally the analysis in Burton A. Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public 
Interest: An Economic Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 4 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 
1978). 
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receives distinguished support from a significant body of empirical and 
analytic literature. 257 Even if judges do not agree with that judgment, 
they should not foreclose the cause of action in the name of the 
Constitution. 
I conclude that Justice Scalia's essay does not justify the view that 
Article III forbids the citizen suit. If Congress has chosen to rely on 
the citizen suit, courts should not foreclose that choice. 
D. Detour IL· The Citizen Suit and the Administrative State 
To make a full evaluation of Lujan, a good empirical picture of the 
citizen suit would be valuable. What effect does the citizen suit have 
on the real world? Is it a valuable instrument of environmental and 
regulatory policy? How many citizen suits have merit? Does the citi-
zen suit produce greater compliance with the law or better regulatory 
policy? In how many cases does the citizen suit facilitate standing, or 
simplify standing issues, compared to a requirement of injury in fact? 
The answers to such questions may not help with the constitutional 
issue. But they will aid in an assessment of whether the demise of 
citizen suits is an important event for administrative law. 
Unfortunately, we have only the most preliminary of answers to 
these questions. In the early period of the citizen suit, exceptionally 
few plaintiffs filed such actions.258 Advocates of this form of enforce-
ment were both surprised and greatly disappointed. But recent years, 
starting with 1983, have seen greater activity, especially under the 
Clean Water Act.259 Between 1984 and 1988 (when the EPA ceased 
collecting data on citizen suits), there were over 800 notices of intent 
to sue under that Act.260 The government was the defendant in 165 of 
these suits. Plaintiffs have won a large number of citizen cases under 
the Clean Water Act.261 Indeed, plaintiffs readily prevail under the 
257. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1667, 1682-87 (1975). 
258. See Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENvrL. 
L. R.Ev. 23, 29 (1985); David A. Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws 
Through Citizen Suits: A Mode/, 60 DENV. L.J. 553, 564-65 (1983). 
259. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 868·69 
(1985). This study shows the following pattern under the Clean Water Act: one suit in 1978; 
eight in 1979; four in 1980; six in 1981; 16 in 1982; 62 in 1983; and 26 in the first four months of 
1984. Id. at 869. 
260. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TuL. L. REV. 
339, 353 (1990). 
261. See id. at 355. For discussion of the reasons why the number of citizen suits under the 
Clean Water Act have increased, see Robert F. Bloomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor 
Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act, 22 GA. L. R.Ev. 337 (1988); 
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 259; Sean Connelly, Congressional Authority to Expand the Class 
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Clean Water Act, apparently because some of the statutory provisions 
speak quite plainly and mandate unambiguous action.262 
Post-Lujan, most environmental suits will be able to go forward 
under the injury-in-fact requirements. An environmental organization 
will typically be able to find a member who has the requisite injury.263 
But the need to show an injury will complicate such suits, and some 
occasions will arise when no plaintiff can be found. Moreover, regula-
tory cases will arise in which the insistence on an actual injury, as 
understood in Lujan, will bar the action altogether. I discuss this pos-
sibility in Part III. 
There is good reason to believe that the citizen suit has indeed 
helped bring about greater administrative compliance with law. But 
there is no reason to think that the citizen suit is a fundamental part of 
modem regulatory reform. I offer a brief account of a long story 
here.264 
In its current form, the citizen suit should be seen as part and par-
cel of a largely unsuccessful system of command-and-control regula-
tion. Under this system, Congress entrusts agencies with the job of 
issuing a massive number of highly centralized, rigid, and often draco-
nian regulatory requirements. It should be no surprise that agencies 
ar.e often unable to undertake their legally required tasks, especially in 
view of the fact that they infrequently receive the necessary resources. 
The citizen suit is part of a complex system in which Congress dele-
gates difficult or even impossible tasks, appropriates inadequate re-
sources, imposes firm and sometimes unrealistic deadlines, 265 and 
enlists courts and citizens in order to produce compliance.266 The sys-
tem may well find explanation in terms of the self-interest of elected 
representatives.267 Credit-claiming for apparently aggressive regula-
of Persons With Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 139 
(1987); Fadil, supra note 258; David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-Financed Environmentally 
Beneficial Expenditures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water 
Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 175 (1991); James L. Thompson, Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties Under the 
Clean Water Act, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1656 (1987). 
262. See Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citi-
zen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL PoLmcs, supra note 137, at 
109. 
263. See infra Part III. 
264. Parts of the longer versions can be found in BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. 
HAssLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS RE-
FORM (1982); DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992); SUN-
srEIN, supra note 162. 
265. On this issue, see Melnick, supra note 161, at 252-55, 300-01. 
266. See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Ad-
ministrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655, 666-67. 
267. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. 
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tion can coexist with a range of real-world loopholes, helping industry 
to escape from government controls. But the public is often the loser. 
In these circumstances, the citizen suit is probably best understood 
as a band-aid superimposed on a system that can meet with only 
mixed success. Instead of band-aids, modem regulation requires fun-
damental reform. Congress should replace the command-and-control 
system with more flexible, incentive-oriented measures.268 Instead of a 
continuing emphasis on judicial review, modem bureaucracy needs 
large-scale shifts introduced and implemented by legislators and ad-
ministrators themselves.269 We should not, however, forget that band-
aids can do some good. The citizen suit may serve as an effective if 
partial alternative to massive regulatory overhaul. In any case, the 
complex policy issues do not bear on the interpretation of Article III. 
E. Coda: What the Court Should Have Said 
From what has been said thus far, we can offer some brief general 
words about the law of standing and Lujan itself. With respect to 
standing in general, the key question is whether Congress (or some 
other relevant source of law) has created a cause of action. Without a 
cause of action, there is no standing; there is no case or controversy; 
and courts are without authority to hear the case under Article III. 
This point suggests that the real source of current difficulty is Data 
Processing, which diverted attention from the relevant question of 
cause of action to the irrelevant question of injury in fact. So long as 
injury in fact was thought to be the issue that Congress itself had made 
relevant under the APA, the difficulty was only minor. But when an 
injury in fact became both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
standing, the area grew badly confused. 
The result was that courts began to grant standing in cases in 
which it should have been denied, and to deny standing in cases in 
which it should have been granted.270 Worse, the Court viewed the 
EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 59 (1992) (discussing the symbiotic relationship between legislators 
and environmental groups). 
268. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 162, ch. 3; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Re-
fonning Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 171 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 137. 
269. This is the lesson of such diverse works as ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 264; 
JERRY L. MAsHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); Acker-
man & Stewart, supra note 268; Melnick, supra note 161; Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton 
Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 
UCLA L. R.Ev. 1251 (1992). 
270. Thus, for example, the court granted standing in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973), an environmental case in which the law student plaintiffs could not easily show a cause of 
action conferred by Congress. Standing should almost certainly have been denied in SCRAP, 
even if an injury in fact might have been found. 
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standing issue through the wrong lens. An injury in fact is not re-
quired by Article III, and it is not sufficient for standing. 271 Both his-
tory and principle show that people with "injuries in fact" may or may 
not have standing. The question is whether Congress has conferred a 
right to bring suit. 
Under this view of the matter, Lujan was a relatively simple case. 
The first question was one of positive law: whether Congress had 
granted or denied standing to the plaintiffs. Congress' grant of stand-
ing resolved that issue. The grant created the relevant injury for Arti-
cle III purposes. There was no need to start with injury in fact and 
redressability, or even to address these issues at all. And if it should 
be thought - contrary to the view presented here - that there are 
some Article III limits on legislative power to confer causes of action 
on citizens, those limits surely were not reached in Lujan. This was, 
after all, a case in which the plaintiffs claimed an intention to go to a 
place where allegedly unlawful government expenditures placed en-
dangered species at risk. The Constitution did not forbid that action 
from going forward. The Lujan Court should not have discussed 
redressability; the congressional grant of standing disposed of the is-
sue. If redressability was relevant, the Court should have said that the 
injury created by Congress - to prevent the U.S. government from 
threatening to produce extinction - would indeed have been re-
dressed by a decree in the plaintiffs' favor.272 
III. THE FUTURE 
Lujan settled some important questions. But it left many issues 
open, and it raised at least as many new ones. The future looks partic-
ularly murky in light of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, which 
refused to join the plurality on redressability, questioned any focus on 
the common law as the exclusive source of injury, and suggested rela-
tively broad congressional power on the issues of injury and 
causation.273 
In this Part, I outline the settled and unsettled issues. I also sug-
gest how some of the current puzzles should be resolved. The most 
important conclusions involve possible congressional responses to Lu-
jan. I suggest that the simplest and most effective response would be 
the creation of a bounty for successful citizen plaintiffs. Such a bounty 
271. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 223. 
272. See infra text accompanying notes 307-10 (suggesting that the ESA should be thought 
to confer a property interest on citizens). 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 188-93. 
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would build directly on the qui tam and informers' actions, and it 
should not raise a constitutional problem in the aftermath of Lujan. 
A more complex response would be for Congress expressly to cre-
ate a property interest in the various regulatory "goods" that it wants 
to authorize citizens to protect. It might, for example, say that citi-
zens generally have a beneficial interest in certain endangered species 
that are at risk from acts of the U.S. government. This somewhat ad-
venturous strategy would have the advantages of building on common 
law notions of interest and injury and of forcing focused congressional 
attention on the precise nature of the rights at stake. It would also 
respond to some of the concerns in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. 
Despite its relative novelty, an approach of this sort should also be 
constitutional. 
A. Easy Cases: What Lujan Permits 
The Lujan opinion does not reject a number of cases in which 
courts have given standing to environmental plaintiffs. On the con-
trary, it expressly endorses many such cases, even when the plaintiff is 
complaining that the executive has taken inadequate action to enforce 
the law. To this extent, the invalidation of the citizen suit allows a 
good deal of room for private litigants - regulatory beneficiaries - to 
initiate proceedings against the executive branch. The case therefore 
introduces some uncertainty into the law, but it probably does not 
work any fundamental shift in the environmental area. 
The Court thus makes clear that, if an environmental plaintiff can 
show that its members use the particular environmental resource that 
is at risk, standing is available. It follows, for example, that a citizen 
in New York could, post-Lujan, complain about the failure to enforce 
clean air or clean water requirements in New York. The Court sug-
gests as much by invoking the Japan Whaling case274 to show that an 
environmental organization could complain of excessive whale har-
vesting when the "whale watching and studying of their members 
w[ould] be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting."275 The 
Court also says that a citizens' council has standing to bring suit to 
challenge environmentally harmful construction in the area where its 
members live.276 
274. Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Socy., 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
275. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 n.8 (endorsing standing in Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230-31 
n.4). 
276. 112 S. Ct. at 2143 n.8 (endorsing standing in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)). 
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It also remains clear that some procedural injuries can produce 
standing under Article III. The Court writes: 
This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural 
requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete in-
terest of theirs (e.g., the procedural requirement for a hearing prior to 
denial of their license application, or the procedural requirement for an 
environmental impact statement before a federal facility is constructed 
next door to them). 211 
A citizen can thus complain about a failure to prepare an environmen-
tal impact statement (EIS) even though it is "speculative" whether the 
statement will cause the project to be abandoned.21s 
Standing remains available in all cases under the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEP A)279 whenever plaintiffs can show that 
the project, if completed, would adversely affect their interests. A con-
crete injury of this kind is sufficient even if ordinary redressability can-
not be shown. "The person who has been accorded a procedural right 
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting 
all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy."2so 
It is clear that the Court believes this; but, as noted above, it is not 
clear why the Court does so. If Article III requires redressability, 
most NEPA suits indeed seem unconstitutional. In the typical NEPA 
action, there is no assurance that completion of an adequate EIS 
would have any consequence at all for the plaintiffs. One might well 
think, as the government urged in Lujan, that NEPA suits frequently 
violate Article III. 
But as the Lujan Court appears to acknowledge, this would be an 
odd and far-reaching conclusion. It is almost always the case that pro-
cedural rights have only speculative consequences for a litigant. If a 
judge is found to have ruled in favor of party A after taking a bribe 
from party A, it remains speculative whether an unbiased judge would 
have ruled for party B. Does party B therefore lack standing? Or 
suppose that an administrator is found to have violated the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act by promulgating a regulation without first pub-
lishing it for comment in the Federal Register. It is entirely 
speculative whether compliance would make any difference to the 
complainants. The Lujan Court, however, does not want the redres-
sability requirement to bar standing in such cases. 
Perhaps the Court is endorsing Justice Kennedy's suggestion that 
277. 112 S. Ct. at 2142. 
278. 112 S. Ct. at 2142-43 n.7. 
279. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-70 (1988). 
280. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2142 n.7. 
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"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of 
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none ex-
isted before."281 More deeply, however, I think that the Court's con-
clusion on this point exemplifies several of the problems associated 
with the whole notion of redressability. A procedural right is created, 
not because it necessarily yields particular outcomes, but because it 
structures incentives and creates pressures that Congress has deemed 
important to effective regulation. The same is true for the sorts of 
interests at stake in the ESA and in many other environmental stat-
utes. Congress is attempting not to dictate outcomes but to create pro-
cedural guarantees that will produce certain regulatory incentives. 
Redressability in the conventional sense is irrelevant. 
This point might well have arisen in Lujan itself. Even though it 
did not, the opinion makes clear that procedural harms remain cogni-
zable when ordinary injuries are involved, despite the absence of 
redressability. 
B. Easy Cases: What Lujan Forecloses 
Thus far I have explained the types of suits Lujan has left un-
touched. But it is equally clear that Lujan forecloses "pure" citizen 
suits. In these suits, a stranger with an ideological or law-enforcement 
interest initiates a proceeding against the government, seeking to re-
quire an agency to undertake action of the sort required by law. Many 
environmental statutes now allow such actions, and plaintiffs have 
brought many suits of this kind. Under Lujan, these suits are unac-
ceptable. Congress must at a minimum "identify the injury it seeks to 
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring 
suit."282 If Congress has simply given standing to citizens,283 this re-
quirement has not been met. The plaintiff must point to a concrete 
injury, not merely to a congressional grant of standing. 
C. Injury in Fact? 
The discussion thus far has focused to a large extent on changes in 
the law of injury in fact. Lujan extends this change, placing a renewed 
emphasis on the notion that the harm must be imminent and non-
speculative. This requirement will likely carry more weight than it has 
in the past. Before Lujan, requiring people to obtain a plane ticket or 
to make firm plans to visit the habitat of endangered species might 
281. 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
282. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
283. See the provisions cited supra note 11. 
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well have been unnecessarily formalistic. Now such actions are appar-
ently required. But this is not a fundamental revision of previous law. 
The celebrated SCRAP case284 is probably a relic. But on that point, 
the handwriting had been on the wall a long time, and, if the analysis 
thus far is correct, there is no reason to mourn for SCRAP, in which 
Congress had not conferred a right to bring suit. 
Harder questions could arise in consumer cases, which play a large 
role in contemporary administrative law. Suppose, for example, that 
the government imposes on automobile manufacturers fuel economy 
requirements that are less stringent than the law requires.285 Typi-
cally, plaintiffs will argue that their injury consists of a diminished 
opportunity to purchase the products in question. 286 After Lujan, 
standing becomes a difficult issue in such cases. A court might find 
that the plaintiffs lack a concrete or particularized interest. They are 
perhaps not readily distinguished from the public at large. There is an 
issue about speculativeness as well: perhaps the relationship between a 
consumer and a product that he allegedly wants is the same as the 
relationship between the Lujan plaintiffs and an endangered species, in 
the sense that in neither case is it clear that the injury will occur as a 
result of the complained-of government acts. 
A consumer case of this sort may differ from Lujan, however, in 
the important sense that a consumer who complains of a diminished 
opportunity to purchase a product can very plausibly claim that he 
will in fact purchase that product. This claim is probably less specula-
tive than that in Lujan. It is possible to discount an "intention" to 
undertake difficult foreign travel at an unspecified time; the intention 
may not show sufficient likelihood of harm. But it is harder to dis-
count an intention to purchase a specified product, which usually ap-
plies to a single, simple transaction. The distinction suggests that, at 
least as Lujan stands, it does not significantly affect the standard con-
sumers' action. In the automobile case, the key point is that a more-
or-less sharply defined category of consumers is distinctly affected in a 
relatively nonspeculative way, and this is probably enough for 
standing.287 
The same would be true in the standard broadcasting case, in 
284. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
285. This was the allegation in Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 
1986), and Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 806 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated per 
curiam, 810 F.2d 302 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reinstated per curiam, 847 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) 
(by an equally divided court), vacated per curiam, 856 F.2d 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
286. See Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d at 1332; Center far Auto Safety v. 
Thomas, 847 F.2d at 849. 
287. But see Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d at 878 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
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which listeners or viewers in a defined area, or of defined program-
ming, challenge an FCC decision that bears on their programming 
choices.288 If the FCC refuses to license a classical music station, 
there is a concrete injury, and it is sufficiently particularized under 
Lujan. The intention to listen to a station is not as conjectural as the 
travel intention at issue in Lujan. 
Greater difficulties may arise in some similar actions, as when, for 
example, consumers challenge an FDA or BP A regulation allowing 
carcinogens to be added to food.289 There may be serious standing 
problems in such cases. A person complaining about such a regulation 
might be said to be suffering an injury that is speculative or genera-
lized. This is especially likely insofar as the injury is characterized as 
an actual incidence of cancer. It is extremely speculative to suggest 
that the introduction of carcinogenic substances into food additives 
will produce cancer in particular human beings. 
The issue becomes harder if the injury is characterized as a greater 
risk of cancer. In that event, the injury is less speculative; but it is 
unclear that it is sufficiently particularized. On Justice Kennedy's 
view, there is probably enough for standing, for he insisted that stand-
ing can exist even if the injury is very widely shared.290 This is indeed 
the correct view, because it is the most plausible conception of the 
injury that Congress sought to prevent.291 But the issue is now open. 
D. Redressability 
Because only four justices concluded that the redressability re-
quirement had not been met in Lujan, the case probably offers no real 
lessons on that issue. After Lujan, the law of redressability thus re-
mains as it was before: Extremely fuzzy and highly manipulable. It is 
manipulable, first, because there is no clear metric by which to decide 
whether it is "speculative" to say that a decree will remedy the plain-
tiff's injury. It is manipulable, second, because, as we have seen, 
whether an injury is redressable depends on how it is defined. If the 
injury in the Bakke case was defined as the right to attend law school, 
the redressability requirement was violated. If the injury in a standard 
environmental case is defined as the right not to suffer concrete per-
sonal health damage as a result of environmental harm, many environ-
288. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 
994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
289. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992); Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
290. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200. 
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mental plaintiffs will be unable to show redressability. If, however, the 
injury is defined as freedom from a certain risk of health damage, there 
is no problem of redressability. This indeed appears to be the way 
courts conventionally treat the issue. 
Consider, for example, some of the regulatory cases described 
above. If an agency changes its policy for determining fuel efficiency, 
will prospective purchasers of fuel-efficient vehicles be affected? The 
answer is not clear. Perhaps manufacturers would simply pay civil 
penalties, rather than change their behavior.292 It is speculative 
whether government policies will change the policies of manufacturers 
soon enough to affect particular consumer choices. 293 If the BP A re-
fuses to allow carcinogens onto the market, perhaps the consumer will 
get cancer in any event; perhaps he will not get cancer whatever the 
BP A does. In fact, the BP A decision may well not make the difference 
in the life of any particular person. Standing might therefore be de-
nied on grounds of redressability. 
If we were to start afresh, the best way to handle the issue would 
be to say that the question of standing depends on whether Congress 
has authorized the plaintiff to bring suit. We should be asking 
whether the injury that Congress sought to prevent would likely be 
redressed by a favorable judgment.294 The redressability requirement 
might be understood as a crude way of asking that very question under 
the general rubric of "injury in fact." We might therefore try to an-
swer the redressability question by characterizing the injury in the way 
desired by Congress, and then seeing if that injury would be removed 
by a decree in the plaintiff's favor. Through this route, the question of 
characterization could be resolved through legislative judgments, not 
judicial ones. And while the resulting issues of statutory interpreta-
tion will not always be simple, they raise the right questions. 
B. What Role Remains for the Citizen Suit? 
The status of the citizen suit is somewhat obscure after Lujan. At 
292. See Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
293. See Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d at 870-72 (opinion by Buckley, J.). 
294. The same point is urged in connection with redressability in Fletcher, supra note 15: 
[T]he causation and redressability question is meaningful only at the level of determining 
whether a cause of action should exist for a certain group of plaintiffs under a particular 
statutory or constitutional provision • . . . [G]iven the different purposes of different statu-
tory and constitutional provisions, some variation is entirely appropriate from one provision 
to another. . • . The question is whether, under the statutory or constitutional provision at 
issue, the particular provision should be read to protect against the injury asserted by the 
kind of person who is seeking to bring suit. 
Id. at 242·43. 
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a minimum, we know that Congress cannot grant standing to people 
who have no personal stake in the outcome of an agency action. But 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, said that Congress "has the 
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will 
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before."295 This 
is a potentially crucial phrase. What does it mean? At a minimum, it 
means that Congress can create rights foreign to the common law. 
These include the right to be free from discrimination,296 the right to 
occupational safety,297 indeed, the vast panoply of statutory rights go-
ing beyond common law understandings. It must also mean that Con-
gress has the power to find causation, perhaps deploying its factfinding 
power, where courts would not do so.298 Justice Kennedy thus sug-
gests that Congress can find causation and redressability even where 
courts would disagree. Perhaps courts will review such findings under 
a deferential standard. 
This view would not change the outcome in Lujan. In that case, 
there was no injury in fact. But it might well make a difference in the 
several cases in which the Court has previously rejected standing on 
grounds of causation and redressability. Congress might well have the 
power to alter those outcomes. 
Suppose, for example, that Congress found that efforts to produce 
desegregation were adversely affected by a grant of tax deductions to 
schools that discriminated on the basis of race. This finding might 
well call for a reversal of the outcome in Allen v. Wright. 299 Or sup-
pose that Congress found that failure to attain national ambient air 
quality standards in New York had adverse health effects on the citi-
zens of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. Per-
haps courts would have to respect this finding. 
The more difficult question involves constraints on Congress' 
295. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
296. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982); Trafficante v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring). As noted above, the Ha1•ens 
Court found an injury to a "statutorily created right to truthful housing information,'' which it 
held sufficient for standing. 455 U.S. at 374. Effectively, Congress had created a kind of prop-
erty interest in such information. The Lujan Court does not explain why Congress may not do 
the same for endangered species, or for the rainforest, or for clean air in an area in which one 
does not live. See supra text accompanying note 202; cf United States Parole Commn. v. Ger-
aghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) (noting that a class action does not become moot after the named 
plaintiff's substantive claim has expired as the representative retains a "personal stake" in ob-
taining class certification). 
297. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988). 
298. See generally Christopher Sprigman, Comment, Standing on Firmer Ground: Separa-
tion of Powers and Deference to Congressional Findings in the Standing Analysis, 59 U. CHI, L. 
REv. (forthcoming 1992). 
299. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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"power to define injuries." Can Congress say that opportunity-type 
injuries are legally cognizable? Might Congress follow the Bakke 
strategy and conclude that standing exists in many cases involving in-
creases in risks or attempts to alter incentives? Lujan provides no au-
thoritative answer. But Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests that 
Congress does possess power to define these events as injuries for pur-
poses of standing. Justice Kennedy emphasized that standing need not 
be based solely on common law-like injuries; his concern was that, in 
creating the citizen suit, Congress had not even identified the injury it 
was attempting to redress. Congress can meet this concern by identi-
fying injuries, building on the common law framework to recognize 
probabilistic, systemic, or regulatory harms. The decreased 
probability of injury, the grant of opportunities, and the provision of 
appropriate incentives are key goals of the regulatory state. It should 
not be difficult for Congress to connect these goals to the injuries it 
seeks to prevent. Nothing in Article III forbids this course, even after 
Lujan. 
F. Private Defendants 
Many citizen-suit provisions in the environmental laws give the cit-
izen the option of initiating proceedings against the private defendant 
allegedly operating in violation of federal law. Formally, Lujan did 
not address this strategy because the case involved a governmental de-
fendant. Does Lujan affect suits against private persons? The answer 
is unclear. We have seen that a large part of the Court's opinion relies 
on the fear that, without a particularized injury, courts will be displac-
ing executive power under the Take Care Clause. This concern is en-
tirely inapplicable when the executive is not even a party.300 On the 
other hand, if Article III does indeed require a personal stake, the 
identity of the defendant should not matter. A case in which a citizen 
initiates proceedings against a private defendant would indeed test the 
claim that the Take Care Clause is a major impetus behind the Lujan 
decision. 
I have argued that this claim makes little sense. If so, and if Lujan 
remains good law, a citizen should not have standing to proceed 
against a private defendant unless he can show some kind of personal 
300. A qualification is necessary here. When private people sue other private people to en-
force federal statutory law, there is a lurking issue about private interference with the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, and hence with the President's "Take Care" power. But this issue 
surely does not have constitutional status. Parallel public and private remedies are most familiar 
to American law; they do not violate the Constitution. 
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stake. After Lujan, the citizen-suit provisions are probably unconsti-
tutional even when the defendant is a private citizen or corporation. 
G. Cash Bounties 
Perhaps Congress can respond to Lujan by granting cash bounties 
to citizen plaintiffs. Indeed, this possibility might produce some of the 
most important and difficult post-Lujan issues. If Congress wants to 
reinstate the citizen suit after Lujan, a cash bounty would be the sim-
plest strategy. Indeed, an exceedingly short amendment to existing 
law, giving a bounty to all successful citizen plaintiffs, should be suffi-
cient. For reasons that follow, the bounty should create an interest 
and hence standing. In this way, a system of bounties would fully 
overcome the post-Lujan doubts about the citizen suit. A bounty sys-
tem would also be more straightforward than the principal alternative 
strategy now available to Congress, involving restructured property 
rights.301 
A bounty system would have the important advantage of building 
on the clear historical precedents of qui tam and informers' actions, 
precedents that are firmly established in American Iaw.302 To the ex-
tent that the citizen suit is a helpful device,303 Congress should be en-
couraged to take this step. At least where administrative inaction is 
both harmful and predictable, and where it cannot be prevented 
through more fundamental regulatory reform,304 a bounty system 
would make a great deal of sense. Indeed, the creation of a system of 
citizen bounties could well be a major step in administrative law. 
1. Private Defendants 
In the first case, Congress might allow citizens to proceec;l against 
polluters or others without requiring a conventional injury in fact, but 
with provision for a financial bounty to victorious citizen litigants. 
Does the bounty create the requisite personal interest or concrete 
stake? 
In this context, Lujan is probably inapplicable by its own rationale. 
There is no risk that courts will usurp executive functions under the 
Take Care Clause. The executive is not a defendant. Not only is the 
executive not involved, but the plaintiff has a concrete interest in the 
form of the bounty. Standing seems perfectly appropriate. In fact, the 
301. See infra text accompanying notes 307-10. 
302. See supra text accompanying notes 59-67. 
303. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 265-69. 
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Lujan Court seemed to invite this conclusion: "Nor, finally, is [this] 
the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private in-
terest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the govern-
ment's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious 
plaintiff."3os The qui tam action and the informers' action3o6 seem to 
be decisive precedents in favor of this conclusion. In both of these 
actions, a bounty was provided, and it would be most adventurous to 
say that these arrangements violated Article III. 
2. Executive Defendants 
In the second case, Congress might give a cash bounty to litigants 
who have prevailed against the government. It might, for example, 
award $500 to plaintiffs in cases involving environmental harms. It 
might even amend all current citizen-suit provisions in order to pro-
vide a cash bounty. A simple statute could accomplish this goal. 
Would this entail a different outcome from that in Lujan? 
The answer is unclear. On the one hand, the executive remains a 
defendant, and the Lujan objection from the Take Care Clause re-
mains. On the other hand, the existence of a cash bounty gives the 
plaintiff the equivalent of a personal stake in the outcome, just like a 
case in which she has a right to obtain damages from a common law 
tortfeasor. This personal stake is probably sufficient to create stand-
ing. Here the informers' action is a direct precedent. 
The Take Care Clause, even as understood in Lujan, is likely to be 
held irrelevant where a bounty is at stake. According to the Court, the 
clause furnishes no objection in a case in which the plaintiff can show 
that the government's allegedly unlawful inaction impairs her enjoy-
ment of some environmental asset. Hence the Take Care Clause is not 
a freestanding objection to suits of this general kind. It is called into 
play only in cases without a personal stake for the plaintiff. If a plain-
tiff can show that she stands to gain or lose from the outcome of the 
action, she is no longer interested only in "law enforcement for its own 
sake." She thus has standing to initiate the action. 
If this analysis is correct, Congress has available a relatively simple 
corrective to Lujan if it believes that the decision will significantly un-
dermine its regulatory goals. Existing statutes can be simply amended 
through the grant of a bounty to victorious citizen plaintiffs. No Arti-
cle III problem would result from this initiative. If Congress wants to 
overcome Lujan, this is the best and simplest route. It would make 
305. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143. 
306. See supra text accompanying notes 59-67. 
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the various citizen-suit provisions constitutional in cases in which Lu-
jan draws them into severe doubt. 
H. Redefined Property Rights 
I have criticized the injury-in-fact test on the ground that it under-
mines Congress' power to create property rights where they had not 
existed before. In Lujan, the plaintiffs might well have asserted that 
the conferral of a cause of action amounted to the creation of a form of 
property. Justice Kennedy had an answer to this claim: "Congress 
has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that 
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before."307 
But here Congress has refused to "identify the injury it seeks to vindi-
cate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring 
suit."308 Apparently, plaintiffs had no property right under the BSA, 
because Congress failed explicitly to define the relevant injury when it 
provided for citizen suits. 
Suppose, then, that Congress attempts to create a citizen suit in the 
following way. It announces, first, that all Americans have a kind of 
property right - a tenancy in common - in some environmental as-
set. The asset might be clean air anywhere in the country, or pristine 
areas, or the continued existence of endangered species in the United 
States or abroad. If this seems odd, we might note that Congress 
could surely create property rights in unowned land within the United 
States; to the extent that such rights do not interfere with the claims of 
a competing sovereign, Congress can create them with respect to 
unowned land outside our territorial borders.309 And surely Congress' 
capacity to create property rights is not limited to land. If Congress 
thus defines property rights and injuries and creates a correlative cause 
of action, has it acted appropriately and met Justice Kennedy's 
concern? 
The answer would seem to be affirmative. The advantages of ex-
press legislative creation of a property right are that it would build on 
common law understandings and produce more focused congressional 
deliberation on the nature of the interest it is creating. The citizen suit 
307. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
308. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
309. The point may seem odd, but we can imagine an example. Suppose that an area in 
Argentina produces medicines especially beneficial to Americans. Suppose that the activities of 
private American companies in Argentina threaten to industrialize that area and thus to elimi-
nate its medicinal capacities. Congress might respond by forbidding these activities and by creat-
ing a property right in all Americans, operating only against other Americans, to the continued 
productivity of the area. This could not possibly raise a constitutional issue, or even a problem of 
international law. 
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has become a relatively automatic part of environmental law, with lit-
tle legislative attention to its nature and consequences. If the citizen 
suit is in fact intended to give all citizens the equivalent of a beneficial 
interest in environmental quality, it may well be desirable to focus 
congressional attention on exactly that question. And if Congress con-
cludes that it seeks to create this kind of property, there should be no 
constitutional problem. 
Indeed, the case would seem to be very close to Havens Realty, 310 
discussed above. If there is a difference, it is that, in the cases under 
discussion, Congress has created a tenancy in common with respect to 
a collective good - that is, property that is jointly owned. In Havens 
Realty, by contrast, the property right could be held by individuals 
rather than many people at once. 
Under Justice Scalia's conception of standing, this distinction 
would make a difference. In the collective good case, unlike in Havens 
Realty, we are hardly dealing with "minorities." Majorities may have 
less need for the citizen suit. But this conception of standing faces 
many problems, as elaborated above. In any event, Justice Kennedy 
clearly disagrees on this point. His opinion plainly says that standing 
is not to be denied simply because many people are adversely affected. 
If all this is correct, some of the most interesting developments in 
the law of standing may arise when Congress is explicit in its intention 
to create new forms of property adapted to the problems and aspira-
tions of modem regulation. If Congress creates property rights in en-
vironmental assets of various sorts, and grants correlative causes of 
action, it should be able to overcome the strictures of Lujan. Faced 
with such an enactment, the Court would not be dealing with a "citi-
zen suit" at all. Instead it would be faced with a suit brought by prop-
erty holders equipped with causes of action; and it would be odd if 
congressional initiatives in this direction would be held inconsistent 
with Article III. 
CONCLUSION 
At least in general, standing depends on whether any source of law 
has created a cause of action. To a large extent, that question is for 
congressional resolution. Congress can create standing as it chooses 
and, in general, can deny standing when it likes.311 As an abstraction 
310. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); see supra notes 125-29 and ac-
companying text. 
311. The foreclosure of standing might, however, raise problems under Article III and the 
Due Process Clause. On Article III, see Richard H. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative 
Agencies, and Article Ill 101 HARV. L. REv. 915 (1988); on due process, see Yakus v. United 
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independent of what the law says, an injury in fact is neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for standing. Indeed, the notion of in-
jury in fact is a form of Lochner-style substantive due process. It 
assumes that there can be a factual inquiry into "injury" independent 
of evaluation and of legal conventions. There can be no such law-free 
inquiry. It is a conceptual impossibility, indeed a form of metaphysics. 
Despite the holding of Lujan, Congress should be permitted to 
grant standing to citizens. The text and history of Article Ill provide 
no support for judicial invalidation of congressional grants of citizen 
standing. On the contrary, England, the American colonies, and early 
Congresses all granted standing to strangers. No one suggested that 
this practice violated the Constitution. The Lujan Court's unprece-
dented invalidation of a provision for citizen standing has no basis in 
Article III. The Court should not have reached its important conclu-
sion without investigating the relevant history, and the odd evolution 
of standing doctrine, in much more detail. 
Lujan answers a long-unresolved issue; but it leaves a number of 
other significant questions unanswered. I have tried to describe how 
they might be resolved. It seems clear that citizen-suit provisions are 
now impermissible in the absence of a showing of injury in fact. But 
Lujan permits environmental actions whenever plaintiffs can show 
that environmental degradation will affect their geographical area in 
the form of dirtier air, dirtier water, or inferior aesthetics. Many suits 
by regulatory beneficiaries will thus remain viable. 
Perhaps most important, Congress probably retains a relatively 
simple mechanism by which to accomplish the purposes that underlie 
current provisions for citizen actions. Certainly it can grant citizens 
standing against private defendants so long as it allows some kind of 
bounty for a victorious lawsuit. Almost certainly, Lujan permits Con-
gress to allow citizens to bring suit against the government for insuffi-
cient regulatory action, if a bounty is made available in the event of 
success. 
Most intriguingly, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion leaves 
open the possibility that Congress has the power to create quite novel 
property interests, to grant those interests to many people or even to 
citizens, and to confer standing to enable people to vindicate those 
interests. It may be that, in cases raising this issue, we will see the 
ultimate depth of the Court's commitment to Lujan 's odd adventure in 
substantive due process. 
States, 321U.S.414, 431-33 (1944). The Constitution might also limit Congress' power to grant 
standing to people attempting to vindicate constitutional rights. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 
278-79. 
